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COURTING GENOCIDE:
THE UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Jide Nzelibe *
Invoking memories and imagery from the Holocaust
and other German atrocities during World War II,
many contemporary commentators and politicians
believe that the international community has an
affirmative obligation to deter and incapacitate
perpetrators of humanitarian atrocities. Today, the
received wisdom is that a legalistic approach, which
combines humanitarian interventions with
international criminal prosecutions targeting
perpetrators, will help realize the post-World War II
vision of making atrocities a crime of the past. This
Article argues, in contrast, that humanitarian
interventions are often likely to create unintended, and
sometimes perverse, incentives among both the victims
and perpetrators of atrocities. The problem is that
when the international community intervenes in the
civil wars or insurrections where most humanitarian
atrocities take place, its decision is partially
endogenous or interdependent with that of the
combatants; humanitarian interventions both influence
and are influenced by the decisions of the victims and
perpetrators of atrocities. Herein lies the paradox:
because humanitarian interventions tend to increase
the chance that rebel or victim group leaders are going
to achieve their preferred political objectives, such
leaders might have an incentive to engage in the kinds
of provocative actions that make atrocities against their
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followers more likely in the first place. More
specifically, the prospect of humanitarian intervention
often increases the level of uncertainty about the
distribution of costs and resolve between the
combatants. In turn, such uncertainty amplifies the
possibility of divergent expectations between the
dominant and rebel group regarding the outcome of a
civil war. At bottom, the prospect of humanitarian
intervention might sometimes increase the risks of
genocidal violence. This Article turns to insights from
the domestic framework of torts and criminal law to
elaborate upon the theoretical framework that
motivates this perverse dynamic, provides some
contemporary illustrations from civil wars in Africa
and the Balkans, and recommends improvements to the
current regime to mitigate some of its unintended
effects. This Article concludes that the optimal regime
of humanitarian intervention would incorporate
comparative fault principles that take into account the
failure of victim (or rebel) leaders to take adequate
precautions against the risks of humanitarian
atrocities.
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INTRODUCTION
“Never Again.” This pithy and evocative phrase, which
conjures up horrific images of the Holocaust and other German
atrocities during World War II, has long been the rallying call
for those advocating a more robust international legal regime to
combat humanitarian atrocities. 1 Today, the belief that
perpetrators of atrocities should no longer be able to hide
behind the shield of state sovereignty has gained wide
currency. 2 Indeed, an emerging international legal norm of the
“responsibility to protect” suggests that the international
community has an affirmative obligation to intervene to
prevent atrocities in states that are unwilling or unable to do
so. 3 Advocates of such a legalistic approach tend to rely loosely
See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at http://
www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html [hereinafter Genocide Convention];
Martin Cook, Ethical and Legal Dimensions of the Bush “Preemption”
Strategy, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 797, 803 (2005) (“Rallied by the slogan
“Never Again!”, individual states and the newly created United Nations
began generation of an entire body of international humanitarian law,
beginning with The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
Genocide Convention, which cumulatively restricted (at least on paper) the
absolute scope of state sovereignty.”).
2 See Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the
Organization, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/46/1
(1991). (“It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference
with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a
protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or
systematically violated with impunity.”); FERNANDO TESON, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 5-12 (1997)
(summarizing normative arguments for humanitarian intervention); SEAN
D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN
EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 202-12 (1996) (same); David Scheffer, Towards a
Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253,
258-59 (1992) (providing normative justifications for a collective regime of
humanitarian intervention).
3 The Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, P 203,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004)
(discussing the contours of the responsibility to protect) (hereinafter High
Level Report); The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, Ontario:
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (2001),
available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf, at paras.
6.36-6.40 (same); see also Christopher C. Joyner, "The Responsibility to
Protect": Humanitarian Concern and the Lawfulness of Armed
1
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on analogies between a global regime of humanitarian
intervention and the domestic framework of torts and criminal
law, with its attendant objectives of deterrence, incapacitation,
and the restoration of victims. 4 Over the past decade, acts of
genocide or mass atrocities have fuelled calls for humanitarian
interventions and/or international criminal prosecutions in the
Balkans, Rwanda, Burma, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Congo, and Darfur (Sudan).
While the imagery of the Holocaust as a clarion call for
humanitarian intervention is compelling, this Article argues
that it has helped spawn an international legal regime that
might have perverse effects. The problem is that unlike the
Holocaust, most contemporary atrocities take place in the
context of full blown civil wars or rebellions in which rebel
leaders are usually pursuing independent political objectives
that might be more valuable to them than the lives of their
followers. Herein lays the paradox: because humanitarian
interventions and prosecutions tend to increase the chance that
rebel leaders are going to achieve their preferred political
objectives, they might have an incentive to engage in the kinds
of provocative actions that make atrocities against their
followers more likely in the first place. In other words, by
Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 716, 723 (2007) (referring to the
responsibility to protect as an emerging international legal norm); AnneMarie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes
of the UN Reform, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 619, 620 (2005) (“[The 2005 High
Level Panel Report] endorsed the “responsibility to protect”--the idea that
the international community has a right and a duty to intervene in states
that cannot or will not protect the human rights of their people against
“genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations
of international humanitarian law.”).
4See High Level Report, supra note ___ at para. 201 (“[T]here is a
growing acceptance that while sovereign Governments have the primary
responsibility to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes, when
they are unable or unwilling to do so that responsibility should be taken up
by the wider international community--with it spanning a continuum
involving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding
shattered societies”); Dino Kritsiotis, Reappraising Policy Objections to
Humanitarian Interventions, 9 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1005, 1016 n.32 (1998)
(“[G]eneral considerations of humanity, and possibly even the deterrence of
acts of internal aggression and repression, are powerful forces behind
policy-based arguments which suggest the need for an acceptance of some
form of humanitarian intervention”); See FERNANDO R. TESON, THE LIBERAL
CASE FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 93-95 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O.
Koehane eds., 2003) (arguing that the international community’s duty to
intervene encompasses the obligations to rescue victims from tyranny if
such intervention can be done at a reasonable cost).
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creating more uncertainty about the distribution of resolve
and resources among the combatants, a legalistic
humanitarian intervention approach might perversely spawn
a vicious cycle of even greater atrocities.
This Article illustrates the perverse logic of humanitarian
interventions and prosecutions by exploring two contemporary
cases: Sudan (Darfur) and Kosovo. While these case studies are
by no means exhaustive, they are highly representative of the
kinds of civil wars in which mass atrocities are likely to take
place. Together, these case studies reveal a consistent pattern:
rebel or victim leaders engage in provocative actions against a
dominant group largely (or partly) because they hope to attract
humanitarian intervention or prosecution against the dominant
group, the dominant group responds by aggressively
committing even more atrocities against the victim group, but
humanitarian intervention either does not come or comes too
late to prevent the bulk of the atrocities.
Traditionally, the question of how humanitarian
interventions affect atrocities has been answered by reference
to both the motivation of the intervening party and the
sovereignty costs imposed on the target of intervention. 5 Thus,
much of the legal and philosophical scholarship on
humanitarian intervention is devoted to institutional design
mechanisms for screening out pre-textual humanitarian
interventions from well-motivated ones. 6 At bottom, however,
much of this literature assumes that well-motivated
humanitarian interventions will have benign effects. Recently,
a number of political scientists have begun to question this
conventional wisdom regarding the interaction between
humanitarian interventions and mass atrocities. 7 In this
picture, since outside intervention during a humanitarian crisis
is likely to bias the outcome of dispute in favor of the rebel
group that is the target of atrocities, some political scientists
have argued that rebel groups might rationally gamble on
humanitarian intervention by provoking the dominant group to
commit atrocities. 8 Such accounts often stress the fact that
humanitarian interventions suffer the same pathologies as
insurance schemes because they create moral hazard by
encouraging risk-taking among the intended beneficiaries.
See infra Part I. A.
See id.
7 See infra Part I.B.
8 See id.
5
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But these rational “moral hazard” explanations are
somewhat incomplete or under-theorized. For instance, these
models do not explain why the dominant group and the rebels
would be incapable of reaching mutually beneficial bargains
that avoid the costs of genocidal violence in the first place.
After all, if humanitarian intervention gives an edge to rebel
groups, we would expect that it would simply increase the
rebels’ bargaining leverage vis a vis the dominant group
without necessarily increasing the chance of a war with
genocidal consequences. Furthermore, these models often
assume a seemingly unrealistic empirical picture of rebel
behavior, which is that rebels are willing to subject themselves
to genocidal violence in order to increase the chance (perhaps
marginally) that they will achieve political objectives like
territorial concession or self-determination. Indeed, one might
argue that according to the same logic, victims in a domestic
setting ought to have an incentive to instigate crimes or torts
against themselves in order to increase the chance that the state
might prosecute or seek restitution against those who wronged
them. Finally, the simple moral hazard story does not account
for why dominant groups would chose genocidal violence rather
than a more targeted form of violence to achieve their military
objectives.
This Article suggests an alternative rationalist
explanation for why the prospect of humanitarian intervention
leads to bargaining breakdowns between rebel groups and
dominant groups that might perversely increase the chance of
mass atrocities. First, the prospect of humanitarian
intervention often increases the level of uncertainty about the
distribution of costs and resolve between the combatants. In
turn, such uncertainty amplifies the possibility of divergent
expectations between the dominant and rebel group regarding
the outcome of a civil war. Moreover, efficient bargaining is
also hampered because the dominant group cannot credibly
identify the “true” rebels with whom it should bargain. Second,
the basic bargaining model is complicated by the fact that there
is often a principal-agent problem between rebel leaders and
non-rebel members of the target group. Simply put, rebel
leaders might often engage in high-risk rebellions with remote
chances of intervention because they reap most of the benefits
of such interventions while non-rebel members of the target
group bear the brunt of genocidal reprisals by the dominant
group. Third, and finally, a state might choose to engage in an
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inefficient war against a rebel group in order to signal a
reputation to future rebels that it is a hard bargainer. Such a
dynamic is especially likely when the perpetrator is a regime in
a weak state that is subject to a high risk of multiple challenges
by other prospective rebel groups. Thus, a dynamic that might
seem inefficient in the short-run might actually be rational
from a long-run perspective.
One consequence of this framework is that it helps
resolve the empirical puzzle as to why rebel leaders might
subject their followers to the risks of genocidal violence just to
increase probabilistically the chance of achieving certain
political objectives. There are three reasons why such a high
risk strategy might be logical in a humanitarian crisis
surrounding a civil war but not necessarily in a domestic
criminal or torts context. First, in a humanitarian intervention
regime, the actual victims who have been harmed by a
campaign of mass atrocities are usually different from the rebel
leaders who stand to benefit the most from humanitarian
interventions and international prosecutions. In the domestic
corrective justice context, by contrast, there is usually some
rough symmetry between the individuals injured and the
individuals who stand to benefit from any compensation
scheme tailored to address such injuries. 9 Second, under the
domestic torts system, a victim who does not take reasonable
precautions to prevent an injury to himself might be barred
from recovery altogether or have his recovery reduced based on
comparative fault principles. 10 But there is no formal
mechanism for reducing relief to rebel leaders who do not take
adequate precautions to avoid atrocities in a humanitarian
intervention and prosecution framework. Third, and most
importantly, the ideal of a torts or domestic corrective justice
framework is to restore the status quo ex ante for the victim,
but humanitarian interventions and prosecutions generally
tend to place leaders of rebel groups in a better position than
the status quo ex ante. 11
The motivation of rebel leaders only tells half the story.
One might wonder why perpetrators from dominant groups
would allow themselves to be pawns in a strategic ploy by rebel
leaders to instigate humanitarian interventions. While
perpetrating atrocities as a strategy to quell rebellions might
See discussion in text at infra notes 26-30.
See id.
11 See id.
9
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not necessarily be optimal, it is hardly irrational. Leaders of
dominant groups usually perpetrate such atrocities as a secondbest response to high stakes rebellions; put differently, where
outright military victory or targeted violence might not be an
available option against the rebel groups because of resource or
political constraints, leaders of dominant groups will tend to
use the threat of indiscriminate violence to coerce the rebel
leaders to abandon their political demands.
Turning to the normative question, this Article proposes
a comparative fault approach to humanitarian interventions to
address the moral hazard problems identified above. Under
this approach, the benefits that rebel leaders obtain from
humanitarian interventions would be reduced when such
leaders have been found to engage in provocative behavior in
the wake of a humanitarian crisis. Typically, peace settlements
negotiated in the wake of humanitarian interventions purport
to resolve the root causes of civil conflicts by accommodating
some of the rebels’ political demands. The problem is that
when the international community intervenes in a civil war and
attempts to restructure the domestic political environment by
forcing or encouraging the combatants to share political power,
they are usually giving the rebel leaders leverage that they
would not ordinarily have absent humanitarian intervention.
And it is this latter factor that partly motivates the perverse
dynamic that leads rebel leaders to initiate suicidal rebellions in
the first place. Alternatively, another strategy is to impose
lustration policies against rebel leaders who have engaged in
provocative behavior against dominant groups. Finally,
reducing the sanctions faced by perpetrators of atrocities would
also reduce the intervention benefits enjoyed by rebel groups.
In sum, this Article concludes that the optimal regime of
humanitarian intervention and criminal prosecution would be
less, and not more robust, than the status quo.
This Article proceeds as follows. The first section of Part
I explores some of the assumptions about the potential effects
of humanitarian interventions and prosecutions in the existing
legal literature and questions some of the comparisons to the
domestic corrective justice and criminal enforcement regimes.
By foregrounding some of the differences between a regime of
humanitarian intervention and prosecution and a domestic
criminal enforcement or torts regime, this Part suggests that
the prevailing assumption that greater investment in
enforcement efforts will necessarily cause a decline in atrocities
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is both mistaken and unrealistic. Section B of Part II discusses
and criticizes the extant political science literature on the
relationship between humanitarian interventions and mass
atrocities. Part II presents a framework that illustrates how
humanitarian intervention and prosecution is likely to affect the
behavior of both perpetrators and victims in the context of a
full-blown civil war or rebellion. More specifically, this Part
explores how the decision of the international community often
interacts with the decisions of perpetrators and victims to
produce unintended consequences, at least in a significant
category of civil wars that involve humanitarian atrocities. Part
III briefly illustrates this perverse dynamic with case studies
from Kosovo and Sudan (Darfur). Parts IV and V build on the
analysis in Parts II and III to explore some empirical
implications of the framework and suggest some normative
recommendations that might mitigate some of the perverse
effects of a global humanitarian intervention and prosecution
regime.
One Caveat: while the interaction between humanitarian
interventions and mass atrocities might be quite complex, this
Article does not purport to argue that the overall net effects of
humanitarian interventions are going to be perverse. Yet, any
empirical assumption that such effects are likely to be benign is
also unfounded. In any event, the more relevant utilitarian
question is whether we can modify the current humanitarian
intervention and prosecution regime to reduce its perverse
effects.
I.

LITERATURE OVERVIEW

Many, if not most, international legal commentators
believe that “well-motivated” humanitarian interventions and
international criminal prosecutions will force perpetrators of
atrocities to internalize the costs of their crimes and make
victims whole in a similar manner as the domestic corrective
justice framework of criminal law and torts. Indeed, to the
extent that the legal literature concerns itself with possible
counterproductive effects of interventions, it tends to focus on
the risks of imposed by third-parties that engage in forceful
military actions for pre-textual reasons. Section A suggests that
the goals and mechanisms of criminal law and bilateral
corrective justice, which make sense in the domestic realm, do
not necessarily translate well to the international regime
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governing humanitarian atrocities Section B then critically
examines the political science literature on the relationship
between mass atrocities and humanitarian interventions.
A.

The Legal Conventional Wisdom

The justifications for the humanitarian and intervention
regime in the legal literature are deeply wedded to the same
ideals of bilateral corrective justice and criminal enforcement in
the domestic legal framework. Generally, the objectives of
corrective justice and retribution in a domestic setting are
accomplished by both criminal law and torts; in this picture,
criminal law focuses largely on sanctioning perpetrators,
whereas the torts system focuses largely on compensating
victims for their injuries and forcing perpetrators to internalize
the economic costs of their wrongful conduct. Like its domestic
counterpart, the global regime targeting atrocities assumes that
there is a clearly delineated perpetrator and a victim who has
been injured by the perpetrator’s actions. 12 Furthermore, the
global regime assumes that the perpetrator has to be stopped or
deterred and the victim restored as much as possible. Based on
this understanding, proponents of the global justice approach
believe that the imposition of a more robust humanitarian
12 For instance, the International Commission Report of the
Responsibility to Protect includes as the goals of humanitarian intervention
not only prevention of genocides but also rebuilding and restoring the
victims and reaching a solution to the underlying conflict. See Report, supra
note ___ at para. 4.19 (suggesting that military intervention would be
justified to avert large scale loss of life or large scale ethnic cleansing); see
also id. at para. 5.1 (discussing the other objectives of rebuilding the society
and restoring victims); FERNANDO R. TESON, THE LIBERAL CASE, supra note
____ at 93-95 (focusing on the international community’s responsibility to
rescue victims from humanitarian harm). Similarly, the establishment of
the international criminal court under the Rome Treaty has also been
justified under deterrent, rehabilitative, and retributivist grounds. See
Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 510, 543 (2003) (observing that ICTs combine a retributive and
deterrent approach); Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism,
and Genocide, 2 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 93, 118-20 (2002) (focusing on
expressivist rationale for ICTs); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity
for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 410 (2000) (“The pursuit
of justice and accountability, it is believed, fulfills fundamental human
values, helps achieve peace and reconciliation, and contributes to the
prevention and deterrence of future conflicts.”); David J. Scheffer, War
Crimes and the Crimes against Humanity, 11 Pace Int’l L Rev 319, 328
(1999) (“As instruments of deterrence, the tribunals are formidable partners
that cannot be lightly ignored in the future.”).
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intervention and prosecution regime that targets perpetrators
and restores victims will presumably lead to an overall decline
in the level of humanitarian atrocities. 13 Indeed, the emerging
international legal norm of “the responsibility to protect”
suggests that states have an affirmative obligation to intervene
to prevent mass atrocities in other states and help resolve the
underlying problem which prompted the atrocities in the first
place. 14 Correspondingly, part of the strategy behind
establishing a permanent international criminal court under
the Rome Treaty is to institutionalize and depoliticize the global
enforcement regime in order to better deter future perpetrators
of atrocities. 15
To be sure, the argument that a more robust
humanitarian intervention and prosecution regime is an
appropriate response to atrocities is subject to criticism on
sovereignty related grounds, including the claim that third
parties might use intervention and prosecution as a pretext to
start wars for reasons unrelated to preventing atrocities. 16 This
Article brackets this objection and assumes for now, consistent
with recent literature supporting humanitarian interventions
and prosecutions, that a non-pretextual humanitarian and
prosecution regime is not only feasible, but that greater media
coverage of wars and recent international legal developments
13 See Bassiouni, supra note ___ at 328.; see also Payam Akhavan,
Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 16 (2001) (discussing the deterrent effects of
international tribunals). The victim-centered perspective looms large in the
legal literature on humanitarian atrocities. For instance, some
commentators have even argued that victims have a right to actively resist
genocide by military means—a right which the international community
ought to respect. See David Kopel, Is Resisting Genocide a Human Right,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275 (2006).
14 See Report, supra note ___at para. 4.19 & para. 5.1.
15 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of
Choosing Accountability over Realpolitik, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 191,
192 (2003).
16 See Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for
War, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 107, 108-09 (2006) (discussing the extensive
literature that alludes to the dangers of pre-textual humanitarian
interventions); Thomas Lee, The Augustinian Just War Tradition and the
Problem of Pretext in Humanitarian Intervention, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
756 (2005) (same); THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION
AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 172, 185-86 (2002) (suggesting that
states could use unilateral humanitarian interventions for self serving
purposes); LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY
144-45 (2d ed. 1979) (“[H]umanitarian intervention can too readily be used
as the occasion or pretext for aggression.”).
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have amplified the costs of pretextual interventions. 17 Indeed,
one of the rationales for trying to institutionalize the
humanitarian intervention regime within the United Nations
framework is to make sure that the obligation to intervene will
be implemented consistently and uniformly and not used
arbitrarily as a political tool to achieve other goals. 18 More
importantly, the possibility that states might act for nonaltruistic reasons should not necessarily disqualify the legality
of humanitarian interventions, since states that act for selfish
reasons can presumably produce normatively desirable
humanitarian outcomes. 19 In any event, the segment of the
legal academy that embraces a more robust regime of
humanitarian intervention assumes intervention might
accomplish some of the same goals as a domestic enforcement
regime; simply put, more enforcement will result in fewer
atrocities. 20
But let us examine closely this analogy between the role
of the international community in the global intervention
regime and that of a law-enforcer in a domestic context. For a
robust enforcement framework to work it must be able to
control wrongdoing in some systematic and predictable way.
Under the domestic criminal enforcement setting, the decision
and resolve of the state to prosecute a crime is always assumed
to be a one-sided affair; thus, while the state is supposed to
influence the perpetrator’s decision to commit crimes or the
victim’s decision to avoid crimes, neither the perpetrator nor
the victim is supposed to be capable of influencing the state’s
decision to prosecute such crimes. 21 For instance, the state in
17 See Goodman, supra note___ at 110 (“[T]he very conditions that
commentators suggest would unleash pretext wars by aggressive states may,
in general and on average, temper the bellicose behavior of those states.”).
18 See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE, 123-25 (1991).
19 See Phillip Bobbitt, What’s in it for US, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON),
June 7 2003, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jun/07/usa.comment (“This
demand - that a state's motives be purely self-sacrificing or are otherwise
discreditable - reflects expectations that are so unrealistic as to be
counterproductive to humanitarian goals. Instead, we should be devising
doctrines . . . that clearly state how the intersection of strategic interests,
measured on a global scale, with humanitarian interests can move states in
the right direction”).
20 See sources cited in infra notes 15-17.
21 Of course, this assumption is subject to some minor qualifications.
For instance, some commentators have observed that criminals can invest
more in anti-detection strategies once the state increases it enforcement
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the domestic setting does not ordinarily have to consider
whether a perpetrator will commit more crimes against a victim
or threaten harm against the state itself in order to persuade
the state not to prosecute a specific crime. Nor does the state in
the domestic law enforcement context ever concern itself with
the possibility that victims might provoke crimes against
themselves in order to benefit from prosecutions against a
perpetrator. Of course, a victim in a domestic setting might get
some “vindictive” pleasure from seeing the perpetrator of a
crime against her punished, 22 but there is no reason to assume
that such benefits will ever outweigh the injuries suffered by the
victim. Thus, the risk that a more domestic law enforcement
framework might create any perverse or unintended
consequences is trivial, if not non-existent.
The international community’s resolve and decisionmaking in a humanitarian intervention and prosecution context
works somewhat differently. Unlike a law enforcement agent in
a domestic setting, the decision of the international community
or third parties to intervene or prosecute perpetrators of
atrocities will often be partially endogenous or interdependent;
in other words, humanitarian interventions and prosecutions
both influence and are influenced by the decisions of the
victims and perpetrators of atrocities. But the problem is that
the objectives of both the perpetrators and the victims in
influencing humanitarian interventions are likely to be
inconsistent with the goals of the international community to
reduce atrocities. Thus, the dynamic makes it very difficult in
many contexts to whether the intervention decision will result
in a net reduction of atrocities.
To understand how interdependent decision-making in
the humanitarian context complicates the traditional law
enforcement model, let us examine how the international
community’s decision might interact with that of the
combatants. Take, the perpetrator, for instance. The
international community’s decision to intervene is often a
function of the international community’s subjective belief
regarding success and the costs of the intervention, 23 but both
efforts. See Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1331 (2006).
22 See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (Hafner Publ’g Co. 1961) (1781) (“Satisfaction thus
administered to a party injured . . . may be styled a vindictive satisfaction.”).
23 Patrick M Regan, Conditions of Successful Third-Party
Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts, 40 J. CONFL. RES. 336, 347-48 (1996)
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of the factors are influenced directly by the resolve and military
resources of the perpetrator. 24 To complicate the analysis even
further, rebel leaders also have the ability to influence the
international community’s decision to intervene. In the
political environment governing humanitarian interventions,
politicians in third-party states might incur significant audience
costs for seeming too reluctant to use military force to end
hostilities and resolve the underlying conflict. 25 But rebel
leaders might exploit this dynamic by engaging in provocative
actions that are more likely to escalate the hostilities and hence
increase the political demand for intervention by domestic
audiences in third-party states.
Of course, one might argue that like victims in a
domestic torts context, the victims of humanitarian atrocities
already internalize the costs of provocative behavior when they
face the wrath of dominant groups. But there are three
fundamental differences between how international
humanitarian and domestic torts regimes influence the
incentives of victims. Collectively, these differences make it
unlikely that victims in a humanitarian intervention context
will have similar incentives to victims in a domestic setting to
take the appropriate precautions to avoid injuries; indeed, these
differences might create perverse incentives for victims (or
rebel leaders) in the context of humanitarian crisis to avoid
such precautions.
First, in the current humanitarian regime governing
atrocities, there is often a distinction between the individuals
who have been injured during a humanitarian crisis and the
individuals who actually reap the windfalls of humanitarian
interventions and international prosecutions. In such a regime,
the primary beneficiaries of humanitarian intervention are
usually the leaders of the victim groups (or rebel leaders) rather
(discussing factors that influence successful third party interventions, such
as the costs of the intervention and the level of casualties); see also PATRICK
M. REGAN, CIVIL WARS AND FOREIGN POWERS at 45 (“[T]here factors can
influence the expected utility of intervening: costs, utilities over outcomes,
and estimates of the likelihood of achieving a successful outcome, all are
intertwined.”).
24 CHARLES KUPCHAN, GETTING IN: THE INITIAL STAGE OF MILITARY
INTERVENTION, IN FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE DYNAMICS OF
PROTRACTED CONFLICT (Ariel Levite, Bruce Jentleson, and Larry Berman,
eds. 1991) at 256 (observing that a third party state will only intervene if it
believes the balance of resolve is in its favor).
25 Barry M Blechman, The Intervention Dilemma, 18 WASHINGTON
Q. 63, 64-65 (1995).
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than the individual victims themselves. This asymmetric
remedial scheme is driven by the simple logic that the
international community cannot realistically negotiate a
cessation of hostilities with all the victims in a humanitarian
crisis, and so the international community has to rely on the
demands of rebel (or victim) leaders as a second-best proxy for
what the victims want. In the domestic corrective justice
context, by contrast, there is usually some rough symmetry
between the individuals injured and the individuals who stand
to benefit from any compensation scheme tailored to address
such injuries. 26
Second, the ideal of a torts or domestic corrective justice
framework is to restore the status quo ex ante for the victim, 27
but humanitarian interventions and prosecutions generally
tend to place rebel leaders in a better position than the status
quo ex ante. Third, under the domestic torts system, a victim
who does not take reasonable precautions to prevent an injury
might be barred from recovery altogether or have his recovery
reduced based on comparative fault principles. 28 But there is
no formal mechanism for reducing relief to rebel leaders who
do not take adequate precautions to avoid atrocities in a
humanitarian intervention and prosecution framework.
26 Indeed, as indicated by the Second Restatement of Torts, a
plaintiff must establish the existence of injury, along with the other elements
of the tort, by a preponderance of the evidence, to qualify for any recovery.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. A (“The word "injury" is used
throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the fact that there has
been an invasion of a legally protected interest which, if it were the legal
consequence of a tortuous act, would entitle the person suffering the
invasion to maintain an action of tort.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
433B cmt. A (observing that plaintiff has to sustain his burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence.).
27 See DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS §1.01 (2003) (defining the primary
purpose of tort damages as an effort to “place the injured party in the same
position that party would have occupied had the wrong not occurred”); see
also Moore v. Safeway, Inc., 700 So.2d 831, 858 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1996) (“The
primary objective of general damages is to restore the party in as near a
fashion as possible to the state he was in at the time immediately preceding
the injury.”); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a
(1977) (noting that compensatory damages are aimed at placing victim in a
“position substantially equivalent in a pecuniary way to that which he would
have occupied” absent tort).
28 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
§ 7 (2000) (discussing rule of comparative responsibility). Almost all
American jurisdictions now follow the comparative negligence system, either
through legislation or by judicial adoption. Dan B. Dobbs, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 201 (2000).
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In short, one cannot assume that the victims (or leaders
of victim groups) in the context of a humanitarian crisis will
have the same incentives to take precautions against risky
behavior as victims in a domestic criminal context. Yet the
conventional wisdom seems to make this assumption; indeed,
the rhetoric governing humanitarian interventions and
international prosecutions seems to cast victims of atrocities as
mostly harmless and vulnerable individuals who have no hand
in their misery. 29 While in practice many of the members of a
rebel ethnic group might have played no direct part in an
unfolding humanitarian crisis, the rebel leaders often do. But
rebel leaders do not necessarily seek to maximize what is in
their followers’ immediate or distant welfare; indeed, like
politicians elsewhere they might be more interested in securing
and consolidating political power. In any event, what is absent
in much of legal literature governing humanitarian atrocities is
any theory of what motivates either rebel leaders or the
perpetrators of atrocities. In the absence of such a theory, it is
hard to predict what the effects of humanitarian interventions
and prosecutions might be on the overall level of atrocities.
B.

The Political Science Literature

In contrast to much of the legal literature and the
mainstream media, some political scientists paint a much more
complicated picture of the relationship between humanitarian
interventions and genocidal violence. Much of this literature
assumes, at least implicitly, that perpetrators often act
rationally when they deploy genocidal violence against their
less dominant adversaries. 30 In other words, rather than acting
out a fanatical or irrational impulse to harm another ethnic
group, dominant groups tend to use genocidal violence
strategically to coerce minority rebel groups to drop their
military demands. But deploying genocidal violence also tends
29See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving
Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 25-26
(1996) (rejecting the notion that the victims of atrocities had a hand in their
victimization).

30 See Benjamin Valentino, Final Solutions: The Causes of Genocide
and Mass Killings, 9 Security Studies 1 (2000) (discussing the rationality of
genocidal violence); Stathis Kalyvas, Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of
Massacres in Algeria, 11 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 243, 245 (1999)
(“[M]assacres can be understood as part of rational strategy aiming to
punish and deter civilian defection under specific constraints”).
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to increase the chance of third-party humanitarian intervention
against the dominant group. Thus, the crucial puzzle is why
certain dominant groups deploy genocidal violence as a tactic,
and why certain minority groups tend to instigate “suicidal
rebellions” against their more dominant adversaries.
In addressing this puzzle, certain political scientists have
suggested that the role of third parties might explain why
certain minority groups engage in the kinds of rebellions that
are likely to spur humanitarian atrocities in the first place. For
instance, Alan Kuperman has argued that intervention by the
international community might unintentionally exacerbate the
risks of atrocities. 31 According to this reasoning, third-party
intervention in the context of a humanitarian crisis operates
somewhat like an insurance scheme that protects both rebels
and other vulnerable individuals from the catastrophic fallout
of a high risk rebellion. 32 Like the role of government insurers
in guaranteeing financial stability for banks, 33 the international
community (or a third party state) intervenes in part to
guarantee the stability of the region in conflict and prevent
massive loss of lives in the wake of a humanitarian crisis. But
like all insurance schemes, humanitarian intervention is subject
to the risk of moral hazard. 34 In this framework, one
consequence of providing such insurance to victim groups (or
rebel leaders) is that rebel leaders will tend to be less selective
in the kinds of rebellions they initiate since they might be
expecting the international community to mitigate the military

31 See Alan Kuperman, Suicidal Rebellions and the Moral Hazard of
Humanitarian Intervention, in ALAN KUPERMAN AND TIMOTHY CRAWFORD
ED., GAMBLING ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: MORAL HAZARD, REBELLION
AND CIVIL WAR1 (2006) (hereinafter GAMBLING ON HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION).
32 See id. at 12-16; see also Timothy Crawford, Moral Hazard,
Intervention, and Internal War: A Conceptual Analysis, in GAMBLING ON
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 26.
33 See Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc. v. FDIC, 789 F.2d 313, 315 (9th
Cir. 1986) (“The function of the FDIC is to help maintain the system by
providing regulatory supervision over banks which it insures and by
providing deposit insurance on a consistent nationwide basis. In this
manner, the United States acts through the FDIC to achieve the
government's goals of providing a safe and sound banking system to foster a
healthy economic environment”).
34For a detailed analysis of the moral hazard effect in insurance
schemes, see Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tex. L
Rev. 237 (1996).
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disadvantages of the rebel group relative to the dominant
group. 35
Although intuitively appealing, the moral hazard
explanation suffers from many difficulties. First, genocidal
violence in the basic framework seems inefficient from a
rational choice perspective. If the risk of humanitarian
intervention favors the rebels in a high-stakes conflict, then it
should presumably increase the rebels’ bargaining leverage
without necessarily increasing the chance of genocidal
violence. 36 Since genocidal violence imposes some costs on
both sides, there should be some peaceful settlement that all
parties would prefer to war. For instance, if the expected value
of intervention increased the chance that the rebels are going to
achieve their ultimate military objective by 20%, then the
government should be willing to make more transfers to the
rebels that reflect the rebels’ increased bargaining leverage.
Second, these models often assume a seemingly unrealistic
empirical picture of rebel behavior, which is that rebels are
willing to subject themselves to genocidal violence in order to
increase the chance (perhaps marginally) that they will achieve
political objectives like territorial concessions or selfdetermination. Third, the simple moral hazard story does not
account for why dominant groups would chose genocidal
violence rather than a more targeted form of violence to achieve
their military objectives.
This Article builds on the moral hazard insights of
Kuperman and others to offer a more general treatment of the
strategic environment in which bargaining failure between the
dominant and minority group leads to genocidal violence. By
focusing on the motivations of the various combatants in a
See Kuperman, supra note __ at 14 (“The international
community has sought to insure vulnerable groups against the risks of
genocidal violence by establishing an emerging norm of humanitarian
military intervention. In so doing, however, it has inadvertently encouraged
such groups to engage in the risky behavior of launching rebellions that may
provoke genocidal retaliation”). Other scholars have suggested that by
reducing the costs of coordinating a rebellion, external intervention
lengthens the duration of civil wars. See Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Nicholas
Sambanis, External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars, World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2433 (2000), available at
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/wbkwbrwps/2433.htm
36 See James Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 INT’L
ORG 379, 380 (1995) (“[W]ar is costly and risky, so rational states should
have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the
gamble of war.”)
35
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context where they anticipate each other’s responses, this
Article highlights the information and structural assumptions
on which the logic of genocidal violence depends. 37
II.

A THEORY OF COMBATANT BEHAVIOR IN THE
CONTEXT OF MASS ATROCITIES

This Part tries to sketch out a theory of genocidal violence
by expanding upon existing explanations why certain groups
rebel and why dominant groups might resort to mass atrocities
to quell rebellions. Section A explores why rebel groups might
be willing to risk genocidal violence against their followers just
to increase their chance to achieve political objectives. More
specifically, this section suggests that agency problems between
rebel leaders and their followers might make provocation of the
dominant groups a rational gamble for rebel leaders, especially
if they anticipate that the dominant group is likely to respond
through indiscriminate violence. This gamble is rational for
rebel leaders because they stand to reap most of the benefits of
humanitarian intervention while non-rebel members of the
target group bear the brunt of genocidal violence. Section B
focuses on the factors that hinder mutually beneficial bargains
between rebels and the dominant group in the shadow of the
risk of humanitarian intervention. Section C turns to the
motivations of perpetrators and suggests that perpetrators
might resort to mass atrocities as a strategy to quell rebellions
when outright military victory over a rebel group is unlikely
because of resource and institutional capacity constraints.
A. Agency Problems and the Strategy of Rebel Leaders
The ideal of a majoritarian theory of political behavior
assumes that political leaders will be faithful agent of the group
they purport to represent. 38 But any sophisticated analysis of
the motivations of rebel leaders ought to recognize that the
behavior of such leaders is likely to be much more complicated
than any conventional model of political leadership would
suggest. As in the cases of Darfur and the Kosovo, the leaders
of rebellions might be largely quasi-military actors or ethnic
37 See id. at 380 (“A coherent rationalist for war must do more than
give reasons why armed conflict might appear an attractive option to a
rational leader under some circumstances---it must show why states are
unable to locate an alternative outcome that both would prefer to a fight.”)
38 See Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the
Citizen-Legislator, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 623, 660-62 (1996) (surveying
rational choice literature discussing what motivates politicians).
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entrepreneurs who have amassed influence and power through
the force of arms or patronage, but rarely do they come to their
positions through the ballot box. In sum, given both the lack of
clear political accountability or any coherently defined agenda
by rebel leaders, the possibility of agency drift or slippage
makes it more difficult to predict whether their actions will
overlap with a majority of the individuals in any of the groups
they purport to represent.
At first blush, rebel leaders might seem to have very little
incentive to put their followers in harm’s way in the context of a
rebellion against a dominant group. But if rebel leaders
rationally believe that humanitarian interventions can alter the
military disadvantage the rebels face in a dispute against a
dominant group, they might have an incentive to gamble on
such intervention even if it comes at the cost of the lives of
many members of their group. Indeed, rebel leaders might still
have an incentive to engage in provocative behavior against the
dominant group even if they believe the chances of intervention
are slim, especially if they are gambling on intervention by a
major power. 39 That rebel groups often have to rely on
intervention by external actors to increase their bargaining
leverage explains why they might engage in provocative
behavior that appears otherwise to be of little strategic value.
But while such provocative behavior might eventually benefit
the rebel leaders, it is not obvious that it would benefit nonrebel members of the target group, especially when the
prospects of obtaining collective goods from the rebellion are
low.
The crucial insight in this dynamic is that there might be
significant divergence between the interests of rebel leaders and
non-rebel members of the target group. In this picture, the
rebel leaders might stand to gain a lion’s share of any benefits
that result from humanitarian intervention while non-rebel
members of the group tend to bear the brunt of the genocidal
violence inflicted by the dominant group. 40 Since rebel leaders
See, e.g, TIMOTHY W. CRAWFORD, PIVOTAL DETERRENCE: THIRDPARTY STATECRAFT AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE 209 (2003) (“Because the
benefits of enlisting the United States in a war may be enormous, even the
slim chance of doing so may goad a party to act provocatively, become
inflexible in negotiations, or otherwise do things that make wars more
likely.”).
40 Indeed, much of literature on the origin of civil wars suggests that
elite rebel leaders are able to overcome collective action problems because
they can obtain substantial spoils from fighting such as trafficking in
39
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rather than non-rebels pose the greatest threat to the dominant
group, it makes sense that rebel leaders will oftenleverage their
threat status to obtain most of the political spoils and monetary
benefits from a negotiated settlement to the conflict. 41
Moreover, since third-party interveners tend to negotiate
directly with the rebel leaders rather than other representative
members of the rebel’s ethnic group, the rebel leaders might
often attempt to negotiate deals that benefit themselves directly
rather than the target group at large, such as political offices,
money, or other substantial government perks.
To be sure, non-rebel members might occasionally
obtain some benefits from a negotiated peace settlement such
as increased regional autonomy or self-determination. In other
words, not all ethnic disputes will be motivated primarily or
exclusively by greed or by the private interests of elites within
the rebel group. But because non-rebel members are often
unsure of the threat they face and what options will best protect
their interests, rebel leaders might find it useful in many
circumstances to manipulate domestic political sentiments by
masking private objectives in strong nationalist rhetoric.
Whether such rhetoric proved to be self-serving is usually not
evident until after a war has started or has been completed.
Moreover, even when non-rebels do stand to obtain some
benefits like territorial concessions, it is not clear that such
benefits will outweigh the costs of genocidal violence inflicted
on such non-rebels by the dominant group.
The question remains: how could the rebel leaders
maintain support within the target group if they impose such
costs on non-rebels? One answer is that non-rebel members of
the target group might support rebel leaders if they believe
there is a chance that the rebellion might yield substantial
contraband and looting. See Paul Collier and Anne Hoefler, Greed and
Grievance in Civil War, World Bank Working paper No. 2355 (2000)
(finding evidence that greed is a better predictor of rebellion than
grievance); see also Paul Collier, Rebellion as Quasi-Criminal Activity, 44 J
CONFLICT RES. 839 (2000) (modeling loot-seeking rebellion).
41 For examples of the kinds of spoils available to rebel leaders in the
wake of a peace settlement, see generally Bumba Mukherjee, Why Political
Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some
Civil Wars, But not Others, 50 INT’L STUD. Q 479 (2006). For other
examples that suggests that groups that pose the greatest threat to their
adversaries get the lion share of the benefits, see Robert A. Pape, The
Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, AMER. POL. SC REV. 2032 (2003)
(noting that suicide terrorism has been on the increase because terrorists
have learned that it pays
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collective goods for the target group, such as greater regional
autonomy or a greater share of government resources. But if the
rebellion progresses to a certain stage without any transfers of
collective goods by the dominant group, then it seems
reasonable that at some point non-rebel members might
conclude that the costs of the rebellion are likely to exceed the
expected benefits. Thus, a more plausible explanation for nonrebel acquiescence is that collective action problems will often
make it difficult for non-rebels to hold rebel leaders
accountable for their high-risk behavior. Indeed, the very logic
that makes rebel leaders overcome collective action problems
when they engage in provocative behavior against the dominant
group—the presence of a substantial private good—will often
makes it difficult for non-rebels to organize against the rebel
leaders. 42 More importantly, non-rebel members of the target
group are often faced with a Hobbesian choice between
incurring the wrath of rebel leaders for withholding support or
otherwise facing the prospect of indiscriminate violence by the
dominant group. 43 Since rebel leaders are likely to have better
information about non-rebel members who are non-supporters
than the dominant group, it might be more prudent for nonrebel members to support the rebel leaders who can then try to
protect them from the more indiscriminate violence
perpetrated by the dominant group. 44 As some commentators
have observed, however, many non-rebel members might very
well choose not to support either side. 45 Anecdotally, this
observation is consistent with reported sentiments of certain
Darfur residents in the ongoing civil war in Sudan who claim
that the rebel leaders do not represent their interests. 46
42 Collier, Rebellion as Quasi-criminal Activity, supra note __ at 839
(“One reason why economists are somewhat dismissive of grievance as a
cause for rebellion is that the provision of justice . . . is a public good and so
faces acute collective action problems. However, even when recruits are
willing to fight for a cause rather than for their own self-interest, predation
may be the sole means by which a rebellion can sustain itself financially.).
43 See T. David Mason & Dale E. Krane, The Political Economy of
Death Squads: Toward a Theory of State-Sanctioned Terror, 33 Int’l Stud.
Q 175 (1989) (“[A]s the level of repressive violence escalates and becomes
more indiscriminate, the option of remaining uninvolved is eventually
precluded because nonelites can no longer assure themselves of immunity
from political repression by simply remaining inert.”)
44 See id. at 176 (“Under such conditions, [non-elites] can be
induced to support rebel organizations by the promise of protection from
indiscriminate violence by the state.”)
45 See id. (“[N]on-elites caught in the crossfire between regime and
rebels would prefer to remain uninvolved, devoting their efforts to the
everyday tasks of securing subsistence.”).
46 See infra discussion in text at footnotes___
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The approach by rebel leaders relies in part on the logic
of strategic interaction. In the language of rational choice, one
could say the rebel leaders anticipate the likely reactions of
their more dominant adversaries based upon the available
information about each other’s resources, capabilities and
preferences. In the context of conflict bargaining in a weak
state where the dominant group lacks both the capability and
resources to deploy targeted violence effectively, the rebel
leaders are likely to gamble that the dominant group will resort
to indiscriminate violence to achieve its objectives. In this
picture, the weaker or poorer the state, the more likely it is
likely to resort to indiscriminate violence to counter challenges
to its authority. 47 Kalyvas is rather explicit on this point: “[T]he
persistent use of indiscriminate violence points to political
actors who are fundamentally weak: this is the case with civil
wars in failed states…, where high levels of violence emerge
because no actor has the capacity to set up the sort of
administrative structure required by selective violence.” 48
When a dominant group in a weak state is likely to resort
to a second-best option of indiscriminate violence as a response
to a rebellion, it gives the rebel leaders an opportunity to exploit
the fallout of such violence in three ways. First, the rebel
leaders will likely gamble that the resultant negative publicity
from the suffering of their followers will propel domestic
audiences in the western world to lobby their politicians in
favor of intervention. Second, because indiscriminate violence
is by nature arbitrary and erratic, the rebel leaders can more

For an analysis of the relationship between weak states and
indiscriminate violence, see discussion in infra Part II (C). Other
commentators have explained the prevalence of indiscriminate violence in
weak states as rooted in the state’s inability to engage in more
accommodative strategies with the opposition. See, e.g., Mason and Krane,
supra note __ at 184. Indeed, the available empirical work suggests that
states with weak institutions or poor states account for a significant majority
of the outbreaks of civil wars. See Halvard Buhaug, Relative Capability and
Rebel Objective in Civil War, 43 J Peace Research 691, 695 (2006)
(“[E]mpirical work has demonstrated that the frequency of domestic unrest
is inversely related to state strength. Transitional and institutionally
inconsistent regimes as well as impoverished countries account for a large
majority of contemporary civil wars.”)
47

STATHIS N KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENT CIVIL WAR 171 (2006)
(discussing examples across a wide range of conflicts).
48
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easily escape punishment by the dominant group. 49 Indeed,
one of the ironies of indiscriminate violence is that because it
targets the “innocent” and the “guilty” alike, it considerably
reduces the costs of provocative behavior by the “guilty” rebel
leaders. 50 More importantly, because rebel leaders are more
likely to have access to better information and resources about
the dominant group’s military strategy than their followers,
they can take measures that lower their risks of exposure to
indiscriminate violence. To be sure, if rebel leaders generally
faced the same risks of reprisals as their followers, they might
be less sanguine about adopting a provocation strategy against
the dominant group in the first place.
Third, rebel leaders also tend to exploit the anger from
reprisals to rally dissenters and otherwise neutral non-rebels in
the target group to their cause. In this picture, reprisals might
drive non-rebels to seek protection from the rebel leaders, even
when the rebel leaders do not otherwise enjoy significant
political support among the target group. The rebel leaders
also capitalize on the reprisals to isolate and marginalize
politically moderate voices within the target group, encourage
recruitment, and raise funds for their violent operations. For
instance, one observer points to precisely such an effect in the
Sudanese government’s brutal tactics against civilians in the
Darfur region: “To acquaint oneself with the rebels for even a
few days is to discover the formula for an insurrection: kill a
boy’s kin, take a man’s cattle, and a rebel is born.” 51 In other
words, the elevated sense of grievance from reprisals
encourages more people to join the rebellion and helps rebel
leaders keep their followers committed to a shared sense of
ethnic identity or communal purpose in challenging the
dominant group. 52
B. The Structural Factors that Lead to Bargaining
Breakdowns

See Mason and Krane, supra note __ at 177 ([M]ost of the victims
of political violence are found among the non-elite, and their support and
loyalty are what ultimately determines the outcome of the struggle between
regime and opposition.”)
50 See KALYVAS, supra note __ at 154-55.
51 See Somini Sengupta, Sudan Government’s Attacks Stoke Rebels’
Fury, NY TIMES, Sept. 11, 2004, at A1.
52 See STATHIS N KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENT CIVIL WAR 151-53
(2006) (discussing examples across a wide range of conflicts).
49
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Even if we concede that rebel leaders have a plausible
reason to
provoke a dominant group in the context of a high risk
rebellion, genocidal violence still seems inefficient. If
humanitarian intervention merely increases the rebel groups’
conflict bargaining leverage, why shouldn’t both parties simply
reach a settlement that reflects the expected outcome of such an
intervention?
This Article suggests four reasons why bargaining
breakdown is likely in the context of a suicidal rebellion that
spurs genocidal violence. First, from the perspective of a
dominant group that worries about developing a reputation
against downstream rebel groups, the decision to got to war
might not simply be a zero-sum game. 53 Thus, when the
dominant group (or government) might be confronting other
potential challengers to its authority in the future, it has an
incentive to refuse to settle despite the significant costs that
might be associated with genocidal violence. In this picture, the
dominant group has to factor in how any conciliatory gestures
towards a rebel group might affect the strategic calculus of
other potential down-stream rebels, especially when the upfront costs of initiating a rebellion are low. 54 If the mere threat
of violence by a rebel group could easily be used to extract
concessions from the dominant group, conciliatory gestures by
the dominant group might actually exacerbate the overall level
of violence across future periods. Indeed, similar concerns
have led some commentators to question the efficacy of
negotiated settlements for long-term political stability,
especially in the absence of a clear military victory by either
side in the dispute. 55 In any event, in the context of weak states
53 This insight draws on insights regarding the motivations of repeat
litigants in the extensive law and economics literature. See DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE Law 220 (1994) (observing that parties
forgo beneficial trades to build credibility in future negotiations); Abhinay
Muthoo, Bargaining Theory with Applications 327-31 (1999) (discussing the
significant role of reputation on bargaining and illustrating with a simple
bargaining model); Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under
Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 749, 765 (2000)
(discussing the strategy of reputation-building among individual buyers and
sellers).
54In Africa, for instance, one commentator suggested that initiating
a rebellion is often easier and less costly than opening up a new business.
See Jeremy M. Weinstein, Africa’s Revolutionary Deficit, FOREIGN POLICY,
July/August 2007, at 70-71.
55 See Edward Luttwak, Give War a Chance, 18 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 36
(1999).
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where most incidents of genocidal violence takes place, the
authority of the regime is often susceptible to challenges from
multiple groups. Thus, the dominant group might likely forego
a bargaining outcome that might be efficient in the short-run in
order to send a strong signal of resolve to other potential rebels.
Second, and importantly, there is likely to be asymmetric
information between the dominant group and the rebel leaders
as to the identity of rebel leaders who truly pose a threat to the
dominant group. Ideally, in the context of a high risk rebellion,
the dominant group will usually prefer to make concessions to
only dangerous rebel leaders. But in the absence of any reliable
information as who constitutes a truly dangerous rebel leader,
members of the rebel group will have an incentive to
misrepresent their level of threat in order to be bribed by the
dominant group. As the standard rationalist account of war
makes clear, bargaining breakdowns are most likely when
parties have important private information about their level of
commitment or resolve and have an incentive to misrepresent
it. 56 Thus, the dominant group often has to rely on battlefield
experience to obtain credible information as to the identity of
truly dangerous rebel leaders. In such a situation, it might be
rational from the dominant group’s perspective to tolerate the
costs of inflicting a certain amount of genocidal violence rather
than make inefficient general concessions to both harmless and
dangerous rebels.
Third, mutually beneficial bargaining might be hindered
by the reality that some of the stakes in a suicidal rebellion
might not be divisible. 57 Often, rebel leaders might make
demands for both selfish or targeted goods that benefit the
rebel leaders exclusively as well as other collective goods that
benefit the larger target group. But some of the demanded
collective goods, such as greater regional autonomy and/or
territory, are not likely to be easily divisible or monetizable
from the rebel leaders’ perspective. For instance, if territory
has unique value to both sides in a dispute, the potential for
bargaining breakdown increases significantly. 58
56

390-93.

See Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, supra note __ at

57 See Steven Shavell, Suit Versus Settlement When Parties Seek
Nonmonetary Judgments, 22 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1993) (modeling breakdown
in negotiations when bargaining involves an indivisible item and
nonmonetary relief).
58 See generally MONICA DUFFY TOFT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF ETHNIC
CONFLICT: IDENTITY, INTEREST, AND THE INDIVISIBILITY OF TERRITORY (2003).
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Fourth, and most importantly, the prospect of
humanitarian intervention is likely to introduce a level of
uncertainty in both the resolve of the combatants and the
outcome of a conflict that did not exist previously. In turn, such
uncertainty increases the chance that both warring parties will
suffer from information failure or have divergent expectations
regarding the ultimate outcome of the rebellion. Two
explanations are frequently offered to explain why rational
disputants might fail to settle in the face of a mutually
beneficial bargain: asymmetric information or divergent
expectations. 59 In the “divergent expectations” framework,
uncertainty arises because both parties make inconsistent
forecasts about the prospects of victory. In asymmetric
information models, one party has private information about a
crucial factor such as combat readiness or resources, and has an
incentive to misrepresent such information. The models have
been used in both the legal literature on trials and the political
science literature on warfare to explain how different beliefs in
ability and/or the cost of litigation influence the option between
settling a dispute or going to trial/war.
Although the divergent expectations and asymmetric
information models sometimes yield different empirical
predictions, 60 I rely on both models to capture some of the
basic intuitions about bargaining breakdown in the wake of an
expected humanitarian intervention. The reason for tentatively
embracing both models is that the goal of this Article is
significantly less ambitious than presenting an all inclusive
theory of bargaining breakdown during a civil war. Rather, the
aim is to simply reassess how one particular event,
humanitarian intervention, might play a contributory role in
bargaining breakdown according to the prevailing models in the
literature that link uncertainty or inconsistent expectations
among combatants to the onset of war. In any event, the
observation that the role of third parties can exacerbate
For a general discussion of these two approaches in the litigation
context see Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and
Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation, 41 J Law & Econ 451 (1998);
see also Keith Hylton, Assymetric Information and the Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 22 J Legal Stud. 187 (1993). There is a similar divide in the
literature attempting to explain why wars occur. Compare James D Fearon,
Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 Int’l Org 379 (1995) embracing an
asymmetric information approach) with GEOFFREY BLAINEY, THE CAUSES OF
WAR (1988) (adopting an inconsistent expectations approach).
60 See Walfogel, supra note __ at 452.
59
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bargaining dilemmas between combatants is not necessarily
novel, although the insights have not been applied specifically
to the humanitarian intervention context. As David Lake and
Donald Rothchild have observed with the respect to the role
played by the assistance by ethnic allies abroad in civil conflicts,
the involvement of such allies can exacerbate the strategic
dilemma because “when groups overestimate the support they
may receive from their ethnic kin, they may become
intransigent and hold out for a better deal than the other group
is willing to accept… Likewise, if groups underestimate the
support their opponents may receive . . . they make too few
concessions to avert violence.” 61
The typical story of how war might result in the
asymmetric information model is that leaders of one group
might have information about their military resources or
resolve that their adversaries do not have. In such a situation, if
the adversaries believe such leaders have an incentive to
misrepresent such information, then this dissembling behavior
could create situations where both parties prefer fighting to a
negotiated solution. 62 In this framework, the risk of
humanitarian intervention could alter the strategic calculus in
favor for going to war by increasing the important of private
information in the bargaining process.
Let us assume, for purposes of argument, that the
relevant risk of humanitarian intervention is “common
knowledge” to both parties; in other words, none of the parties
has greater access to information regarding the probability of
humanitarian intervention than the other. In most
circumstances it is reasonable to think that neither of the
parties will be really informed about the willingness of the third
party to intervene in an ongoing crisis. In the presence of such
mutual uncertainty about intervention, neither of the
combatants can predict with confidence the level of assistance
that the rebels will receive. For instance, it might be
unthinkable for the rebels to engage a dominant group if both
sides know that there is no chance that a third party will
intervene in the ensuing conflict. But if both parties are unsure
61 See David A Lake and Donald Rothchild, Spreading Fear: The
Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict, in David Lake and Donald
Rothchild ed., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict 30 (1998).
62 See Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, supra note __ at
395-96.
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about the prospects of humanitarian intervention then the risks
of bargaining failure due to information problems increase,
especially since neither side is likely to be fully aware of each
other’s scope of ignorance or beliefs about the risks of
intervention and both sides have an incentive to misrepresent
their beliefs. But even if both parties were somewhat informed
about the chances of intervention, the possibility of bargaining
breakdown still remains if the rebels have private information
about their level of resolve which they cannot communicate
credibly to the dominant group. In other words, in the absence
of common knowledge about rebel willingness to fight, the
rebels cannot simply announce to the dominant group that the
presence of humanitarian intervention has significantly
increased their level of resolve because the dominant group will
have little reason to believe them. 63
Turning to the divergent expectations model, first
advanced in the legal literature by Priest and Klein, the claims
is that cases that do not settle will be concentrated among
disputes close to the decision standard. 64 In this picture, a trial
is more likely where a torfeasor’s conduct was almost negligent
or a little bit negligent than when the tortfeasor was seriously
negligent or completely careful. Why? Because disputants are
more likely to make inconsistent judgments about the outcome
of a dispute that are close to the decision standard where any
small error in the plaintiff’s judgment will cause her to believe
that she will win a significant judgment. 65 Correspondingly,
when the outcome of the dispute is close to the standard, a
small error in the defendant’s judgment will cause her to
believe she will pay nothing. However, when the outcome of
the dispute is far from the decision standard (such as when the
defendant is terribly negligent), it would then a larger error in
the disputant’s judgment to make a mistake over the likely
outcome of the dispute if it were to proceed to trial.
Similarly, in the context of a suicidal rebellion, the
potential involvement of third parties is likely to alter the
strategic calculus of the parties in a manner that could lead to a
bargaining breakdown. This dynamic could be explained
63 For more detailed analysis as to why combatants might have an
incentive to misrepresent their level of resolve, see Fearon, Rationalist
Explanations for War, supra note __ at 395-401.
64 See George Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud. 1 (1984).
65 See id.
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intuitively. For a rebel group to even have a hope of engaging in
conflict bargaining with the dominant group, its threat to go to
war has to be credible. In other words, the expected value of
the spoils of war to the rebels multiplied by the probability of its
prevailing against the dominant group has to exceed the
expected costs to the rebels of prosecuting the conflict. But in
the absence of the prospect of third party intervention, the
“true” likelihood of rebel victory will often be slim if not trivial.
In this picture, it would require the rebels to make a greater
error regarding the likely outcome of the war than when there is
a non-trivial possibility of third-party intervention. But if the
rebel threat to go war is not credible, the dominant group is not
likely to entertain serious conflict bargaining with the rebels at
all.
A more concrete illustration will help explain this
dynamic. Let us imagine that rebels expect to obtain concrete
benefits worth $1,000,000 from wartime victory and each side
is likely to incur fighting costs of $200,000. Assume further
that the rebel group’s real probability of prevailing without the
prospect of humanitarian intervention is 0.05. In this case, for
the rebels to believe that their threat to go war is even credible,
they would have to erroneously believe that their chance of
prevailing is at least 0.2, which is 4 times higher than their real
chance. Otherwise, the expected net recovery to the rebel group
(including costs) would actually be negative [i.e,
(.05*$1,000,000) - $200,000) and the dominant group would
have no incentive to make a positive settlement offer to the
rebels at all. Thus, the rebel is like the plaintiff in a tort dispute
in which the defendant has exercised an exceedingly high level
of care and the litigation costs are fairly high; in such
circumstances, we would expect incompatible estimates of the
outcome of the dispute between the combatants to be rare
because it would require a fairly large error to push the rebels’
beliefs over the true outcome threshold. 66 In other words,
given the objective lack of factors in favor of the rebels, the
chances that both sides are likely to have divergent beliefs
about what will happen on the battlefield should be small.
Let us change the facts a little bit and assume that the
prospect of third party intervention increases the chance that
See Hylton, Asymmetric Information, supra note ___ at 196 (“A
central proposition of the Priest-Klein model of selection is that disputes in
which the evidence points strongly toward either innocence or guilt are more
likely to settle than those in which it does not.”)
66

30

the rebel will prevail against the dominant group to 0.25. Let
us further assume that the rebels erroneously believe that their
chance of prevailing is 0.6, while the dominant group
erroneously believes that its chance of prevailing is close to 0.1.
Thus, the rebels will not settle for any amount less than
$400,000 [i.e. (.6*$1,000,000) – ($200,000)] and the
dominant group will not be willing to pay the rebels more than
$300,000 [i.e., (.1*$1,000,000) + ($200,000)]. In this picture,
there is no longer any prospect for agreement between the
combatants and so they are likely to go to war. More
importantly, however, bargaining breakdown occurs in this
model even though neither of the combatants’ errors was as far
from the actual outcome as in the previous example.
To summarize, the Klein-Priest model assumes that that
the disputants are more likely to have incompatible beliefs
about the possible outcome of a dispute where the probability
of liability is most uncertain—i.e., close to 50%. Building on
that insight, this section suggests that to the extent that the
prospect of humanitarian intervention to protect rebels
introduces a level of uncertainty about the outcome of a conflict
that previously did not exist, it increases the chance of
bargaining breakdowns between rebels and dominant groups
that will lead to civil wars. Moreover, humanitarian
intervention might actually make conflict bargaining against
the dominant group a rational strategy for rebel groups,
especially when without intervention the rebels’ costs of going
to war are likely to exceed the rebels’ expected benefits.
C. The Motivations of Perpetrators in High Stakes
Rebellions
An integral piece of this perverse dynamic involves the
motivations of the perpetrators of the atrocities. Contrary to
the received wisdom in the legal academy, 67 evidence in the
political science literature suggests that the leaders of dominant
groups who engage in humanitarian atrocities are not
67 See MARTHA L. MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS:
FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 50 (Beacon Press
1998) (describing perpetrator’s behavior as irrational); see also Robert D.
Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits
of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal
Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 72 (2007) (suggesting that the same costbenefit analysis we make in the domestic sense might not apply and the
perpetrators might not be rational.).
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necessarily motivated by irrational or fanatical hatred, but
rather by a particular logic. These leaders usually perpetrate
such atrocities to attain specific political objectives; 68 in other
words, where outright military victory might not be an available
option against the rebel groups because of resource or political
constraints, leaders of dominant groups will tend to use the
threat of mass atrocities to coerce the rebel leaders to abandon
their political demands. 69 As such, the use of mass atrocities
simply becomes another tool of coercion adopted by dominant
groups, but it is more likely to be used by dominant groups in
weak or insecure states that lack the military capabilities to
force rebel leaders to sue for peace. 70
Nonetheless, the behavior of perpetrators in the context of
high-stakes rebellions is still puzzling, especially when one
considers that rebel leaders might be gambling on reprisals by
such perpetrators in order to increase the chance of
humanitarian interventions. But why would perpetrators allow
themselves to be used as pawns in a strategic game by rebel
leaders? More importantly, why would they not focus their
efforts on killing or punishing rebel leaders, rather than
targeting supposedly innocent and vulnerable members of the
victim groups?
Although perpetrating atrocities might not necessarily be
the optimal approach for quelling high-risk rebellions, it is not
necessarily irrational. First, perpetrators might lack the
resources or ability to engage in selective violence against
armed rebel groups. For dominant groups in weak or failed
states subduing and defeating the rebels by force of arms is not

BENJAMIN A. VALENTINO, FINAL SOLUTIONS: MASS KILLING AND
GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 69 (2004) (“My research... also
suggests that perpetrators may view mass killing as a rational way to counter
threats or implement certain types of ideologies.”); Helen Fein, Patrons,
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Observations on Bosnia and
Rwanda, in THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE: RWANDA AND YUGOSLAVIA
RECONSIDEREd 5 (Helen Fein ed. 1994) (“Genocide is preventable because it
is usually a rational act: that is, the perpetrators calculate the likelihood of
success, given their values and objectives.”).
69 See Valentino, supra note ___at 69-70.
70 See Mason & Krane, supra note __ at 184-85. Indeed, there is a
growing literature that suggests that state weakness is a large factor in the
onset of civil wars. See, e.g., James Fearon and David Laitin, Ethnicity,
Insurgency and Civil War, 97 AMER POL SC REV 75(2003 (arguing that state
weakness favors insurgency more than other factors such as ethnic and
religious characteristics).
68
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usually an option. 71 In such circumstances, the state or the
dominant group might likely resort to the blunt and arbitrary
use of force against civilian populations as a non-ideal strategy
to motivate the rebels to drop their political demands. As
Jeffrey Herbst suggests in his study of African militaries,
“[a]lthough these blunt strikes usually do not work, they should
not be seen as irrational given the circumstances African
leaders face. Leaders may feel they have no alternative than
striking out blindly in order to stomp out insurgencies.” 72 Of
course, there is no guarantee that this second-best approach
will work, 73 but such dominant groups usually operate in a
realm of uncertainty where they cannot usually foresee the
consequences of various policy alternatives.
Second, even when perpetrators are aware that leaders
of rebel groups are strategically trying to provoke retaliation,
they may still consider it rational to retaliate against such
groups. In this picture, perpetrators from the dominant group
are likely to rationally discount the probability that retaliation
against the rebel groups will provoke a humanitarian
intervention because such interventions are usually both
politically and economically costly for the third parties
involved. 74 The perpetrators understand that even when the
71 See Mason and Krane, supra note __ at 177 (“[E]scalating
repression is perpetrated not because it has a high probability of success but
because the weakness of the state preclude its resort to less violent
alternatives”); see also KALYVAS, supra note __ at 171 (discussing the logic of
indiscriminate violence among weak states).
72 See Jeffrey Herbst, African Militaries and Rebellion: The Political
Economy of Threat and Combat Effectiveness, 41 J. PEACE RES. 357, 362
(2004).
73 In the language of economics, these dominant groups in weak
states are likely to resort to atrocities against rebel groups as a “second best
strategy” because the optimal strategy of defeating the rebels militarily
through selective violence is either too costly or impractical. See R.G. Lipsey
& Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON.
STUD. 11 (1956). For a general application of the second-best theory to
modern day constitutional theory see Adrian Vermeule, Hume's Second-Best
Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421 (2003).
74 See De Mesquita & Downs, supra note __ at 630-32 (discussing
the enormous political costs democratic leaders incur from interventions,
especially when there is a risk that intervention will fail); Jack Goldsmith,
The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93
(2003) (“Nations do not lightly expend national blood and treasure to stop
human rights abusers in other nations”); David Luban, Intervention and
Civilization: Some Unhappy Lessons of the Kosovo War, in GLOBAL JUSTICE
AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE MORAL AND POLITICAL
CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION (de Greiff and Cronin eds. 2002) (observing
that if the domestic audience subscribes to the belief that only wars in
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chance of humanitarian intervention is relatively remote, rebel
leaders might still find it worthwhile to provoke the dominant
group because the rebel leaders do not fully internalize the risks
of their provocative behavior since non-rebel members of the
target group bear the brunt of the violence.
To be sure, deploying selective violence against rebel
leaders or indiscriminate violence against civilians does not
exhaust the dominant group’s options for responding to a
rebellion. If there is a risk that the use of genocidal violence
might eventually hurt the dominant group, why wouldn’t the
dominant group try instead to act in a conciliatory fashion
towards the rebels by accommodating some of their key
demands or do nothing? A fully developed response to this
question is beyond the scope of this Article. While admittedly
speculative, the analysis below suggests two possible
explanations as to why dominant groups are unable or
unwilling to ignore rebel provocations.
First, as mentioned earlier, a conciliatory strategy
towards the rebels can be problematic from a long run
perspective, especially when the government (or dominant
group) might be confronting other potential challengers to its
authority in the future. In this picture, the government has to
factor in how any conciliatory gestures towards a rebel group
might affect the strategic calculus of other potential downstream rebels. Second, and more importantly, the dominant
group is more likely to incur a greater political cost should it fail
to respond to rebel provocation than it is from the distant
possibility of a third party intervening in response to genocidal
violence. Simply put, by failing to respond to rebel provocation,
the leaders of the dominant group risk appearing weak and
indecisive before a domestic audience, which might in turn spur
demands for regime change or otherwise embolden the political
opposition. But if the dominant group has no cost-effective way
to check the rebels other than by engaging in indiscriminate
violence, then either by engaging in indiscriminate violence
against the target group it effectively destroys the base from
which the rebels draw their support, or it inadvertently
increases the chance of humanitarian intervention. And while
the latter outcome is admittedly undesirable for the dominant
group, it might often be less costly than allowing the rebels to

pursuit of national interest should be fought then avoiding any casualties in
a humanitarian war becomes a priority for elected officials).
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provoke unchecked and hence increase the chance of
involuntary regime change.
*

*

*

To summarize, the dilemma imposed by humanitarian
intervention is that while it imposes a tax on the dominant
group, it also often provides a subsidy to rebel leaders. This
ambiguous incentive structure makes it rational for both rebel
leaders and the dominant group to act in ways that guarantee
each a chance at their first best outcomes, and no worse than
their second-best outcomes, by the rebels instigating and the
government carrying out genocidal violence, the main costs of
which are borne by others—i.e., non rebel members of the
target group.
III.

CASE STUDIES FROM THE BALKANS AND AFRICA

This Article explores two brief empirical cases from
Darfur and Kosovo to illustrate the logic of unintended
consequences in the context of humanitarian interventions. 75 In
each case, the threat of humanitarian intervention influenced
the calculus of both rebel leaders and perpetrators in complex
and unpredictable ways. More specifically, the threat (or
prospect) of humanitarian intervention seemed to have
influenced rebel leaders to escalate provocative behavior
against a dominant group, even when the provocation would
likely result in genocidal violence against civilian members of
the rebel leaders’ group.
Rebel confidence in a provocation strategy was bolstered
in part because they had recently witnessed other groups who
had successfully used violence to instigate humanitarian
intervention or external pressure against the dominant group.
The decisions to engage in a high-stakes rebellion in both of
these cases also significantly increased the political stature of
marginal rebel leaders and spoilers who previously had little or
no political capital or leverage among the host communities
75 We note that other commentators have suggested a similar
unintended dynamic in the Bosnian and Rwandan civil wars. See Alan J
Kuperman, Provoking Genocide: A Revisited History of the Rwandan
Patriotic Front, 6 J GEN. RES. 61 (2004) (Rwanda); Alan J. Kuperman,
Suicidal Rebellions and the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Interventions,
in GAMBLING ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION at 1 (Timothy J. Crawford &
Alan J. Kuperman, eds. 2006) (Bosnia and Kosovo).
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they purported to represent. Finally, rebel leaders in both of
these examples seemed to consider provocation a worthwhile
strategy even if the chances of a humanitarian intervention
were slim because they bore very few direct risks from any
reprisals from the dominant group. Put bluntly, the rebel
leaders tended to view even low prospects of humanitarian
intervention optimistically because they rarely internalized the
full costs of their provocative behavior.
Of course, these two cases are not sufficient to
demonstrate that humanitarian interventions will invariably
escalate atrocities. Instead these cases illustrate that the
relationship between humanitarian intervention and atrocities
is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant closer examination by
policy-makers and legal academics.
A.

Darfur

At first glance, the Darfur crisis in Sudan seems like a
puzzling case to illustrate the pitfalls of humanitarian
intervention. After all, much of the conventional commentary
on the crisis assumes that it has been largely ignored by the
international community; 76 indeed, foreign observers and
NGOs tend to blame the reluctance of western powers to
intervene for escalating the crisis. 77 In reality, however, the
opposite is true: Darfur’s crisis has been partly exacerbated by
the level of outside attention it has received over the past four
years. While much of that attention has been well-intended and
has helped publicize the plight of Darfuris to the outside world,
it might have unintentionally compounded the crisis by fuelling
intransigence and high-risk provocative behavior on the part of
Darfur rebel leaders.
A stark illustration of the perverse role of outside
intervention in the Darfur crisis can be gleaned from multiple
See Harold Koh, Restoring America’s Human Rights Reputation,
40 Cornell Int'l L.J. 635. 653 (2007) (“The crisis in Darfur remains an
international disgrace. The United States sadly has failed to lead the way in
preventing what Secretary of State Colin Powell forthrightly called a
“genocide” several years ago.“Never again” should not mean “Never again,
except in Africa.”); Romeo A. Dallaire, Looking at Darfur, Seeing Rwanda,
NY Times, October 4, 2004.
77 See Human Rights Watch, Too Little, Too Late: Sudanese and
International Response 2004, available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/8.htm#_Toc71531709.
76
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efforts by the United Nations and the African Union to
negotiate ceasefires to the conflict. In a series of rounds of
peace talks culminating in Abuja, Nigeria in 2006, all but one of
the rebel groups categorically rejected a peace plan proposed by
outside mediators, including African Union leaders and US
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. 78 Surprisingly, the
Sudanese government agreed to the plan even though it was
presented by the mediators on a take it or leave it basis in order
to force the government’s hand. 79 The plan would require that
government disarm all government militias in the region and
devote millions of dollars in aid to reconstructing Darfur and
compensating victims of the humanitarian crisis. Nonetheless,
two main rebel groups, the Abdul Wahid Faction of the
Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM), refused to sign the agreement. The Abuja
scenario repeated itself again in 2007 when the Libyan
government hosted another round of peace talks and invited all
rebel groups, including minor splinter rebel groups to
participate. 80 Once again, the Sudanese government suggested
its willingness to negotiate, 81 but many of the key rebel groups
did not even bother to show up at the talks. 82
But why would the Darfur rebel groups refuse to
compromise with the Sudanese government even though doing
so would likely avert further atrocities? The simple answer is
that they believed they could profit from holding out. Even
though these rebel groups had almost no chance whatsoever of
prevailing militarily against the Sudanese government, they
believed that outside humanitarian intervention would
eventually tip the balance of conflict bargaining in their favor.
Therefore, they refused to back away from the most strident
aspects of their negotiating positions even when those demands
were “unrealistic.” 83 As intimated by Abdel Wahid, the leader of
78 See Bashir Adigun, Darfur Rebels Reject Sudan Peace Offer,
WASH. POST, May 1, 2006, at A1; see also Alex de Waal, Darfur: The Inside
Story, THE NEW AFRICAN, April 2007, at 29.
79 For an in depth discussion of the negotiations, see International
Crisis Group, Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement, Africa Briefing No. 39,
June 20, 2006, at 2
80 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Rebel Unity is Scarce at the Darfur Talks
in Libya, NY TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, at A1.
81 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Sudan Declares Cease-Fire at Darfur
Peace Talks, NY TIMES, October 28, 2007, at __
82 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Rebel Unity is Scarce at the Darfur Talks
in Libya, NY TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, at A1.
83 International Crisis Group, Darfur: The Failure to Protect,
AFRICA REPORT NO. 89 (2005), at 14 (hereinafter “ICG, Darfur: The Failure
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one of the main rebel factions that refused to sign the Abuja
accord, verbal assurances of implementation of the agreement
from the United States government were not sufficient: “I want
a guarantee of implementation like in Bosnia.” 84 A 2005 report
by the International Crisis Group (ICG) supports the notion
that outside support loomed large as part of the rebels’ strategy:
“The rebels have equated [international] condemnation of
Khartoum as support for their cause, and this has hardened
their negotiating positions.” 85 Even Alex De Waal, an adviser to
the African Union mediation team who is not known to be welldisposed to the Sudanese government, has conceded that rebel
leaders like SLA’s Abdul Wahid were hesitating to cooperate in
negotiations because they were “banking on outside military
intervention that would drive the Sudanese army from
Darfur.” 86
The Darfur rebel leaders were gambling on a greater role
by western states because they were first-hand witnesses to a
recent episode where it seemed to work. More specifically, they
had observed closely how overt pressure from the United States
had led the Sudanese government to make generous
concessions as part of the 2004 agreement to end the four
decade old civil war between the Sudanese government and the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of southern Sudan. 87
Even though the SPLA had failed to make significant military
headway against the Sudanese government, the international
community managed to extract generous commitments from
the government, including an agreement to set up a separate
vice president for the south, an oil resource sharing
arrangement, and an agreement to hold a referendum on
southern secession in 2011. 88 Indeed, many of the demands
made by the Darfur rebels, such as the demand for a separate

to Protect”). As Alex De Waal has suggested elsewhere, the real underlying
goals of the two hold-out rebel groups was regime change in Khartoum but
the international support for that objective was pretty weak. See Alex de
Waal, Briefing: Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for Peace, 104 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
127, 131-32 (2005).
84 Quoted in Alex de Waal, Darfur: The Inside Story, THE NEW
AFRICAN, April 2007, at 30.
85 See ICG, Darfur: The Failure to Protect, supra note __ at 9.
86 Ales de Waal, The Wars of Sudan, THE NATION, March 19, 2007,
at 18.
87 See id. at 16-18 (discussing the background of the North-South
war and the eventual peace settlement ending the conflict).
88 See id.
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vice presidency, 89 mirror some of the concessions made by the
Sudanese government to the SPLA. The negotiations that led to
the 2004 North-South agreement, which specifically excluded
any commitments on Darfur, gave the Darfur rebels reason to
believe that they could also benefit from western intervention
(or attention) if they too mounted an offensive rebellion against
the Sudanese government, despite the obvious military odds
they were facing. 90 In any event, as many experts on the region
have observed, the North-South conflict and the Darfur
rebellion are inextricably linked. 91 Indeed, the Darfur rebels
had unsuccessfully attempted to make their demands a part of
the original north-south negotiation, it was only upon being
ignored that they resorted to force of arms. 92
At bottom, until the Darfur rebels first launched their
insurrection against the Sudanese government in two raids in
February and April of 2003 there was virtually no genocidal
violence in the region. 93 The second raid, which consisted of a
surprise attack on an airport in El-Fasher, was surprisingly
ambitious and brazen: the rebels immediately killed thirty
government soldiers, captured the air base commander, and
seized some military aircraft. 94 According to U.S. government
sources, they also summarily executed about 200 government
89 See Bashir Adigun, Darfur Rebels Reject Sudan Peace Offer,
WASH. POST, May 1, 2006, at A1
90 See International Crisis Group, Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New
Crisis, AFRICA REPORT NO. 76 at i(2005) (hereinafter “ICG Darfur Rising”)
(“Rebels, not participants in the peace talks, concluded that they had to fight
lest decisions on power and wealth sharing for the entire country be taken
without them’); Patrick Johnston, Negotiated Settlements and Government
Strategy in Civil War: Evidence from Darfur, 9 CIVIL WARS 359, 364 (2007)
(“The Sudanese government’s agreement to make significant concessions to
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in southern Sudan . . . gave Darfur
home defense militias reason to believe that civil war . . . would yield
significant political gains.”).
91 See Samantha Power, Dying in Darfur, Can the Ethnic Cleansing
in the Sudan be Stopped, THE NEW YORKER, August 30, 2004, available
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/08/30/040830fa_fact1
(observing that Darfuris decided that to achieve their goals, they would have
to replicate what John Garang, the SPLA leader, had done in the South).
Indeed, the SPLA’s leader John Garang apparently also provided counsel to
the Darfur rebel leaders about how to organize an insurrection successfully.
See JULIE FLINT & ALEX DE WAAL, DARFUR: A SHORT HISTORY OF A LONG WAR
81-82 (2005)
92 See ICG Darfur Rising, supra note __ at i; Johnston, supra note
__ at 365.
93 GERARD PRUNIER, DARFUR: THE AMBIGUOUS GENOCIDE 92, 95-96
(2007).
94 See id at 95-96.
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soldiers they had captured as prisoners of war. 95 To be sure,
the Darfur rebels had legitimate grievances against the
Sudanese government, which included long-standing
government neglect of the region as well as ethnic
marginalization by the Arab leadership in Khartoum. 96 But
until the negotiations that ended the North-South war, the
Darfur leaders or officials did not resort to rebellion as a tactic
to address their grievances and the government rarely adopted
strong-armed tactics in response. 97 Occasional fighting did
break out between ethnic African and nomadic Arabs over
grazing rights in the Darfur region, but most of these conflicts
were contained and occurred sporadically over the 1980s. Both
the Arabs and ethnic Africans in the region had managed to
address their differences without ever resorting to large-scale
violence. 98
Thus, the crucial event that triggered the 2003
insurrection and the subsequent backlash by the Sudanese
government was the North-South peace negotiations. Other
competing theories as to why the Darfur rebels launched their
rebellion fall short: for instance, articulated grievances about
ethnic marginalization were longstanding but were hardly
increasing; indeed, from the early independence period until
the unexpected airport ambush by rebels in 2003, the Sudanese
government approach to the Darfur region was one of benign
neglect. At the time the North-South peace agreement was
being negotiated, none of the participants, including the outside
mediators, thought the problems in the Darfur region were
significant enough to be addressed as part of the agreement. 99
See id.
See id at 81-91 (detailing grievances by the Darfur groups against
the central government).
97 Johnston, supra note at 364 (“Although violent dispute had arisen
sporadically since the 1970s, Arabs and non-Arabs lives for decades in the
same region without large-scale organized warfare. . . Despite the
emergence of a security dilemma, civil war still did not occur.”)
98 See id.
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and secondary. See Scott Anderson, How Did Darfur Happen?, NY TIMES,
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Eventually the Darfur rebel leaders’ strategy did attract
significant outside attention, especially by the western media
and governments, but not quite the military intervention that
that they hoped. However, it is premature to suggest that the
rebel leaders’ approach was a strategic failure. Commentators
like Alex De Waal are correct to suggest that rebel leaders like
Abdul Wahid are misguided because none of the major powers
are ever likely to have the appetite for the kind of large scale
military intervention they are expecting. 100 Instead, the rebels’
tactics have largely alienated many of the western powers they
are seeking to court. As one State Department official put it:
The first notion anyone's got to disabuse themselves of is
that there are any good guys in this. There aren't. The
S.L.A. started this war, and now they and the Justice and
Equality Movement are doing everything possible to
keep it going. . . [T]hey've been very content to sit back,
let the village burnings go on, let the killing go on,
because the more international pressure that's brought
to bear on Khartoum, the stronger their position
grows. 101
Ironically, however, while the Darfur rebel leaders are not likely
to achieve their preferred objective of western military
intervention, they have nonetheless improved their status as
political actors. When measured against the pre-rebellion
baseline, the rebel leaders are better poised to obtain political
spoils that would have been unlikely absent the current
international attention the crisis is receiving.
The rebel leaders have already benefited significantly on
one front. The international focus on the Darfur crisis has
helped catapult many of the rebel leaders into important
political brokers even though it is not clear that their rebel
activities were supported by the populations they purport to
represent. Indeed, the government has already offered targeted
benefits to certain rebel leaders to encourage them to lay down
their arms, including high political positions and cars. 102 But as
one commentator observed from field research conducted a
100 See Alex de Waal, Darfur: The Inside Story, THE NEW AFRICAN,
April 2007, at 30.
101 Quoted in Scott Anderson, How Did Darfur Happen?, NY TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2004 at Section 6.
102 See Johnston, supra note __ at 372.
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year after the war started: “Most of the Darfur people
interviewed for this research…--and most of them supportive of
the rebels agenda for change--stated both their opposition to
armed rebellion, and their belief that the current violence
escalated in response to the insurgency.” 103 Certain rebel
leaders who have profited from the crisis do not even purport to
represent any of the significantly large ethnic groups in the
Darfur region. 104 More importantly, during a recent visit to the
region by US officials involved in mediating the conflict, various
non-governmental organizations and community groups in
Darfur publicly expressed concerns that these rebel leaders do
not act in their interests. 105 Because of such agency concerns,
the UN has attempted to organize representative councils that
will better articulate the interests and concerns of ordinary
Darfuris during peace negotiations. 106 The rebel leaders have
not welcomed this development. As Andrew Natsios, the US
Special Envoy to the Sudan was informed during a recent visit
to the region: “One of the rebel leaders, Abdel Wahid-al-Nur . . .
has threatened through his henchmen in the camps to kill
anyone who volunteers to serve on the councils.” 107
Far from constituting a cohesive political front, the rebel
leaders consist largely of unelected spoilers from different
ethnic groups in the Darfur region and beyond with disparate
interests who are often at odds with each other. For instance,
in July 2005, Mini Minawi’s Zaghawa faction of the SLA
launched an attack against the Abdel Wahid’s Fur faction,
killing more than 70 people and raping 39 women. 108 Since the
2003 rebellion itself, the rebels have further splintered into
dozens of groups, each with a different agenda and in
competition with each other for the political spoils that are
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likely to emerge from any eventual settlement. 109 Some of the
rebel leaders and their key supporters come from backgrounds
that are divorced from Darfur altogether: Hassan al-Turabi,
who is a sponsor of the JEM, is of Arab origin and was formerly
spiritual mentor to both President El-Bashir and Osama Bin
Laden; 110 and Abdel Karim Bari (Tek) of the National
Movement for Reform and Development, is a former Zaghawa
dissident officer in the Chadian army who is currently on the
UN sanctions list for alleged war crimes. 111
While provocation has yielded the Darfur rebel leaders
some concrete political benefits, it has rarely come with any
significant attendant costs to them--militarily or otherwise.
Since the rebellion started five years ago, hardly any key rebel
leader has been killed or seriously injured in battle. For the
most part, the rebel leaders have managed successfully to
insulate themselves directly from the fallout of much of the
carnage occurring in the region. Indeed, one of the key rebel
leaders—Abdel Wahid—has safely ensconced himself in Paris
for the past two years from where he continues to make trips to
internationally-mediated peace negotiations. Of course, some
rebel leaders have suffered from the Khartoum government’s
ability to strip away at some of their political leverage through
its “divide and rule” tactics, but hardly any of them have found
themselves in a worse off condition that they were at the
beginning of the rebellion. 112
In response to the rebels’ provocative behavior, the
Sudanese government has adopted an unconventional strategy,
deploying nomadic Arab militias known as the Janjaweed to
attack and raze black Darfur settlements. 113 The Sudanese air
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force has also engaged in air raids in support of the militias, 114
but the Sudanese government’s decision not to engage the
rebels exclusively through conventional military means has
been the source of significant controversy within the ruling
regime. 115 In any event, the Janjaweed’s brutal tactics has
deservedly proven to be an international public relations
debacle for the Sudanese government. But from a purely
military standpoint, it is not obvious that the Sudanese
government’s decision to deploy the Janjaweed was irrational.
The Sudanese government had to confront certain
unpleasant realities about a conventional military approach at
the early stages of the rebellion: (1) because the regular
Sudanese army had a significant number of black Darfur
conscripts, its loyalty in squashing the rebellion in the region
was suspect; 116 and (2) the use of irregular Arab militias was
considered much more cost-effective than deploying
conventional forces. 117 This latter factor led one commentator
to declare that the Sudanese government was waging a
“counterinsurgency on the cheap.” 118 Nonetheless, given the
poor track record of African militaries in quelling rebellions, 119
including that of the Sudanese army in fighting the southern
SPLA rebels, the Sudanese government might have rationally
conjectured that a blunt strike against civilian targets by hired
militias would be its most effective option. Perhaps the logic of
Khartoum’s approach is rooted in the belief that it needed to
clamp down as forcefully and cheaply as possible against the
Darfur rebels to ward off any future rebellions, especially in a
context where the regime was viewed as vulnerable and
weak. 120 In hindsight, the Sudanese government’s strategy

See id at 106-11
For details of the internal regime dispute over the use of the
Janjaweed, including the vehement opposition of General Suleiman, the
governor of North Darfur see JULIE FLINT & ALEX DE WAAL, DARFUR: A
SHORT HISTORY OF A LONG WAR 97-102.
116 See Prunier, supra note __ at 97.
117 See Prunier, supra note __ at 97-100.
118 See Alex de Waal, Counterinsurgency on the Cheap, LONDON
REVIEW OF BOOKS, August 5, 2004, available online at
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v6/n15/waa101_.html.
119 See Herbst, supra note __ at 362..
120 This logic makes sense in an the African context where rebellions
are relatively really cheap to initiate, See Jeremy M Weinstein, Africa’s
Revolutionary Deficit, FOREIGN POLICY, July/August 2007, at 71 (“In much
of Africa, the barriers to entry for rebel movements are too low. With states
often incapable of projecting power outside of cities and insurgenst easily
114
115

44

backfired: as the Janjaweed unleashed a savage
counterinsurgency that has left thousands of innocent civilians
dead and millions displaced, it created an international outcry
that had the unintended effect of initially elevating the stature
of some of the rebel leaders.
While the Sudanese government might have lost the
public relations battle against the rebels, its unconventional
tactics might have yielded some concrete military benefits.
More specifically, its strategy of alternately attacking civilian
Darfur settlements and then offering generous concessions to
particular rebel spoilers has significantly splintered the Darfur
rebels, thereby weakening the rebels’ negotiating leverage. 121
This strategy has potential significant downstream benefits for
the government because it suggests that even if a
comprehensive peace settlement is eventually negotiated, it
might be easily be able to subvert implementation of the
agreement on account of the lack of rebel unity. The latter
scenario is not entirely hypothetical. Indeed, the southern
SPLA has repeatedly threatened to drop out of the current
coalition government because it alleges that the Khartoum
government has consistently undermined the implementation
of the 2004 North-South agreement. 122
Let us assume for the moment that a negotiated
settlement is somehow possible in Darfur. How stable is it
likely to be? Given Khartoum’s track record in implementing
the North-South agreement, it has shown that it is adept at
scuttling long-term power-sharing commitments and playing
off various opposition groups against each other. 123 Since the
Darfur rebel groups are far less cohesive and organized than the
SPLA, the prospects for any sustainable peace agreement do not
look particularly promising. Moreover, given the reluctance of
western governments and the African Union to launch a more
robust intervention force now that Darfur is constantly in the
media spotlight, it is unlikely that the international community
able to finance their own private armies, just about anyone can hoist a flag,
arm recruits, and launch a revolution.”)
121 See Johnston, supra note __ at 366-71 (discussing how the
government’s strategy of making concessions to rebel spoilers has
significantly splintered the Darfur rebels).
122 See International Crisis Group, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace
Agreement: Beyond the Crisis, Africa Briefing No. 50, 13 March 2008
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will be willing to invest the resources to monitor the long-term
implementation of an agreement once the “CNN effect”
surrounding the crisis has receded. But whatever the outcome
of any future peace negotiations between the Sudanese
government and the rebels, it is likely to include tangible
benefits to the rebel leaders, such as government posts, money,
or other perks. Indeed, various rebel spoilers have already
taken advantage of the government’s generosity in return for a
commitment to undermine other rebel leaders who are still
holding out. 124 The Sudanese government might also succeed
in politically emasculating the Darfur region if it displaces or
kills a significant portion of its residents. Thus, regardless of
how the Darfur crisis unfolds, the upshot for both the rebel
leaders and the Khartoum regime is that they can potentially
improve their status quo ex ante. In the end, the groups that
stand to lose are the long-suffering residents of Darfur.
B.

Kosovo

The events that propelled the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) to launch a rebellion against the Serbian government
have been the source of an engaging and lively academic debate
about the merits of NATO’s Balkan strategy. 125 The
conventional narrative, at least in NATO policy circles, was that
it was extremist Serbian elements in Belgrade who fostered the
conditions that created both the KLA and the subsequent
humanitarian crisis that the rebellion spawned in 1999. 126
According to that narrative, Milosevic instigated the crisis in
1989 by revoking Kosovo’s regional autonomy and embarking
on a systematic campaign to marginalize the Albanian majority
in the region. 127 The KLA was purportedly created as a
response to Serbia’s discriminatory policies. In 1998, after
See Johnston, supra note __ at 372 (discussing benefits that
Darfur rebel spoilers have already received from the government, including
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facing degrading treatment by the Serbs for a decade, the
Kosovar Albanians were left with no option but to launch a
rebellion. NATO then had to step in at the last moment in 1999
to avert Serbian genocidal violence against Kosovo’s Albanian
majority.
Recently, however, commentators have begun to
question this narrative. For instance, Alan Kuperman has
persuasively argued that it was the threat of NATO’s
intervention that created the dynamic that led to Serbia’s
genocidal violence against the Kosovar Albanians in the first
place. 128 More specifically, Kuperman shows that the KLA
initiated a high risk rebellion in 1998 hoping that the prospect
of a brutal Serbian response would tip NATO’s decision calculus
squarely in favor of military intervention. 129 Provoking a
genocidal response from Belgrade seemed a worthwhile
rational gamble by the KLA because the KLA had recently
witnessed how similar genocidal violence by the Serbs had
instigated humanitarian intervention by NATO on behalf of
Muslim rebels in Bosnia. 130 The KLA rebel leaders understood
that a military victory against the more dominant Serbian army
was implausible, yet the prospect of a NATO intervention
dramatically lowered the risks of a provocative rebellion. As
one of the Kosovo Albanian negotiators subsequently conceded
in an interview: “The more civilians were killed, the chances of
intervention became bigger, and the KLA of course realized
that.” 131
My argument here complements this growing literature
by showing that the rebellion and the subsequent NATO
intervention catapulted the KLA leadership from relative
obscurity and anonymity into key power brokers. More
specifically, the KLA exploited the post-rebellion Serbian
reprisals to shore up its marginal status as a political
organization and consolidate allegiance to its goals and tactics,
even when it barely enjoyed any significant support among
Kosovo Albanians. Also, rather than dampen the prospects of
atrocities, the threat of a NATO intervention actually
emboldened the resolve of hard-line KLA leaders, who took
advantage of the threat to isolate and weaken moderate Kosovo
leaders who preferred a more conciliatory approach to resolving
See Kuperman, Suicidal Rebellions, supra note __ at 10-12.
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the crisis. In sum, the KLA employed appeals to ethnic
solidarity and nationalist sentiments to alter the domestic
political landscape in Kosovo in favor of violently seeking
independence.
Prior to 1997, the KLA was a relatively marginal player in
Kosovo’s political scene. As an ideological group committed to
violent political challenge, KLA faced daunting challenges in its
quest to attract either resources or recruits. As Tim Judah
observed: “The KLA [in 1996] consisted of some 150 men and .
. . most Kosovars, let alone people outside of Kosovo, had heard
of them.” 132 Despite some Albanian disenchantment with
Belgrade’s decision to strip Kosovo of its autonomy in 1989,
Kosovar Albanians under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova for
the most part embraced a pragmatic approach to resolving the
crisis. 133 Rugova favored passive resistance and hoped informal
international pressure would bring Belgrade to the table to
negotiate the autonomy issue. 134 Although there were some
simmering grievances, very few Kosovar Albanians seemed to
have the appetite to embark on what seemed like a hopeless
rebellion against the Serbs. More importantly, the Serbian
leadership felt little need to adopt strong-arm tactics against
the Kosovar Albanians; thus, up until the KLA started
escalating attacks against Serb targets in 1997, there was hardly
any large scale violence deployed by either side in the region.
Two events foreshadowed a change in the Kosovo
political landscape that significantly diminished the political
stature of moderates like Rugova and emboldened the KLA.
The first was the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 under which
NATO forced the Serbian leadership to make significant
concessions to both Bosnian Muslims and the Croatians. 135 The
second was the Albanian pyramid financial scandal of 1997.
The latter event triggered a descent into political anarchy in
Albania and the subsequent looting provided a ready source of
both guns and funds to the KLA rebels. 136 The former event
suggested to a growing number of Kosovar Albanians that a
violent insurrection against the Serbs might be a plausible
strategy. In other words, after both the Bosnians and Croatians
TIM JUDAH, KOSOVO: WAR AND REVENGE 131 (2000).
See id. at 98-111
134 See IVO H DAALDER & MICHAEL E. O’HANLON, WINNING UGLY:
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had launched violent rebellions against the Serbians despite
overwhelming military odds, the west intervened in response to
the genocidal retaliation and facilitated a peace settlement that
forced the Serbians to make significant concessions. To the
mediators in Ohio, however, Kosovo was not a key priority and
it was not discussed as part of the settlement. 137 For Kosovar
Albanians who choose a more peaceful and conciliatory
approach to the Serbs, the Dayton Peace Accords seemed like a
slap in the face. 138
The KLA resorted to a two prong strategy to capitalize on
the fallout from Dayton. First, they escalated their attacks
against Serbian targets and launched a full blown rebellion in
1998 hoping to trigger reprisals, and then they used the Serb
crackdowns to try to convince previously skeptical Kosovar
Albanians that violent resistance was the only available option.
The KLA leaders calculated, somewhat correctly, that ordinary
Kosovar Albanians would be more sympathetic to a hard-line
nationalist stance against the Serbs given the concessions made
by the Serbs to the Bosnian Muslims and Croats in Dayton. 139
Second, and most importantly, the KLA gambled that the
worsening humanitarian crisis in the region would make it
difficult for NATO to ignore Kosovo as it did in Dayton.
Ironically, despite the fact that the KLA was able to recruit large
number of participants and grew substantially in its first years
of operation, it still did not enjoy significant political support
among ordinary Kosovar Albanians. In an election held in
March 1998, the year the KLA launched its rebellion, Rugova
and his moderate LDK (Democratic League of Kosova) party
gained an overwhelming victory despite KLA calls to boycott
the election. 140
In the end, the escalation of the crisis in Kosovo did get
NATO’s attention. After a series of botched attempts at peaceful
negotiations, NATO issued an ultimatum to Milosevic in 1999
at Rambouillet, France to surrender Kosovo sovereignty for an
interim period of three years or risk a sustained bombing
attack. 141 Milosevic refused to accede to NATO’s demands and
shortly thereafter NATO mounted an aerial bombing campaign
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against Serbia. 142 Apparently, NATO strategists assumed that
Milosevic would cave in quickly after the bombing started or
that the bombing itself would trigger some kind of regime
change in Serbia. 143 In the end, NATO’s strategy backfired.
Rather than forcing Milosevic to back down immediately, he
escalated the level of atrocities against the Kosovar Albanians.
By the time Milosevic had capitulated after 11 weeks of NATO
bombings, Serb forces had killed as many as 5,000 Kosovo
Albanians and displaced or deported another 850,000. 144
The Kosovo crisis reveals the kind of security dilemma
that can be created by determined but marginal spoilers in
ethnic conflicts. Despite the reality that most Kosovar
Albanians did not seem enthusiastic about a violent
confrontation with the Serbs in the 19990s, the KLA’s tactics
were able to precipitate Serbian reprisals that in turn triggered
a humanitarian response by NATO. To be sure, the Serbs could
have probably deflated the KLA’s strategy by being more
conciliatory and accommodating to Kosovar Albanian political
moderates like Rugova. But given the presence of both the
KLA’s violent tactics and NATO’s escalating threats, Milosevic
probably calculated that any concessions to Kosovar Albanians
would be construed as weakness by his domestic audience.
Similarly, Rugova, who had been a long-time advocate of
peaceful negotiation, would probably have found it harder in
the face of Serbian reprisals to respond to any peace gesture
that would have Kosovar Albanians give up on demands for
independence or greater autonomy. In the end, the KLA’s
tactics probably widened the gulf between a peace settlement
on both sides of the crisis.
IV.

EMPIRICAL CHALLENGES

The claim that humanitarian interventions and
international prosecutions can have unintended effects begs the
question: if humanitarian intervention might cause some
atrocities but prevent others, what are its net effects on the level
of atrocities? There is probably no easy answer to this question
because it is difficult to determine a priori those humanitarian
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atrocities that never occurred because of the plausible threat of
a humanitarian intervention. Any humanitarian intervention
regime presents the familiar empirical problem of the “dog that
did not bark.” Of course, one might try to isolate circumstances
where atrocities have already begun before humanitarian
intervention occurred and ask how intervention affected the
level of atrocities, but that analysis would still be infected by a
selection bias that would likely give us an inaccurate picture of
the effect of humanitarian interventions. For instance, one
might argue that for dominant groups that are particularly
sensitive to military retaliation by the international community,
even a marginal increase in the risk of intervention might be
sufficient to deter them from committing atrocities.
One possible solution to this problem would be to isolate
all instances in which a civil war or significant rebellion took
place and ask why atrocities took place in certain contexts, and
not others. The problem with such an approach, however, is
that it will prove ultimately difficult to attribute any decision by
a perpetrator to embark or not embark on atrocities to the risk
of humanitarian intervention since the threat of some form of
external intervention is presumably present in all civil wars.
Moreover, humanitarian interventions and international
prosecutions might have indirect effects on the decision by
oppositional groups to embark on civil wars and rebellions in
the first place. For instance, certain minority or subordinate
groups that have strong strategic ties with third-party states
might find it unnecessary to initiate rebellions as a means to
achieve political goals, thereby making it less likely that such a
group will be involved in a civil war. Of course, the dynamic
could cut both ways: certain groups might be more willing to
initiate civil wars and rebellions if they believe that downstream
intervention by third-party states makes it more likely that they
will extract important concessions from the dominant groups.
In sum, since the empirical question of the net effects of
humanitarian interventions and prosecution is plagued by
uncertainty, it would be premature to assume that either
dramatically expanding or reducing the number interventions
or prosecutions will be beneficial. 145 But are there legal or
145 Some commentators have argued that interventions that focus on
stopping perpetrators tend to decrease the severity of mass atrocities. See
Matthew Krain, International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides
and Politicides, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. (2005) (providing empirical data to
support such a relationship). But such studies do not address the moral
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other strategic policy changes to the current humanitarian
intervention and prosecution regime that might alleviate some
of its perverse effects? Are there ways the international
community might continue to engage in humanitarian
interventions without undermining the possible benign effects
of such interventions? To explore some of those questions, Part
V discusses some legal and political changes to the current
humanitarian regime that might mitigate some of the regime’s
perverse effects.
V.

NORMATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS

What legal and political changes would alleviate the
some of the unintended effects of humanitarian interventions
on the level of atrocities? This Part argues that the
humanitarian intervention regime should try to adopt some of
the insights of comparative fault from the domestic corrective
justice framework. Section A suggests that the international
community could try to reduce the benefits to rebel leaders of
humanitarian intervention when such leaders have engaged in
provocative behavior against dominant groups, which is how a
comparative fault mechanism works in the domestic torts
regime. Section B suggests that another approach would be to
allow the rebel leaders’ provocative behavior to absolve
perpetrators from certain sanctions and prosecutions by
international criminal tribunals, which is how the defense of
provocation partly works in domestic criminal law.
A. Applying Comparative Fault Principles to
Interventions
One way to discourage rebel leaders from engaging in
provocative behavior against dominant groups is to adopt a
comparative fault approach which would limit the political and
hazard problem we have identified, which involves the risk that the prospect
of intervention might lead rebel leaders to engage in high risk or provocative
behavior against dominant groups in the first place. In other words, it will
be difficult to make any conclusive empirical generalizations about the net
effect of humanitarian interventions on the level of atrocities unless one can
also isolate the risks that humanitarian interventions might actually cause
some atrocities. Indeed, Krain seems to assume away the possibility that
humanitarian interventions could have any effect on the strategy of rebel
leaders. See id. at 365 (“Any attempt to understand how intervention might
affect the severity of genocides or politicides must focus on the
intervention’s effect on the perpetrator rather than multiple sides in a
conflict.”).
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economic benefits rebel leaders stand to gain from
humanitarian interventions. Evidence of a systematic and
continuous pattern of provocative behavior against a dominant
group could be treated as a proximate cause of any resultant
humanitarian crisis, which would result in a reduction of
benefits to the victim groups. The implicit assumption in this
framework is that both the rebel leaders and the perpetrators
would be jointly responsible for the resultant harm to the
victims and the relevant humanitarian intervention regime
would try to ensure the both groups internalize the costs of
their actions. 146 Of course, the international community might
decide to apply appropriate evidentiary principles in making
judgments as to whether any provocative behavior by a victim
group is a proximate cause of any particular atrocity, including
possibly requiring that the various incidents have some
temporal proximity to the alleged provocative behavior.
The comparative fault principle in a humanitarian
intervention context could work in one of two ways: (1) the
imposition of lustration against the rebel leaders upon the
successful completion of a humanitarian intervention; (2) the
refusal of the international community to impose (or force) any
political solution to the underlying conflict that fuelled the
atrocities. In both scenarios, the proportionality of the
dominant group’s response to the provocation would obviously
be a factor in determining how significantly the international
community should reduce the benefits to the rebel groups. For
instance, a grossly disproportionate retaliation by the dominant
group might warrant an intervention that specifically gives
military leverage to the rebel group.
In the case of lustration, rebel leaders who expect that a
humanitarian intervention would help them secure a favorable
power-sharing arrangement with the dominant group would be
out of luck. 147 To be sure, any such lustration principle would
146 For an argument that a properly calibrated comparative
negligence regime would provide the best incentives to both victims and
injurers in a tort scheme to take optimal precautions, see Ezra Friedman,
The Robust Efficiency of Comparative Negligence (Oct. 22, 2007)
(unpublished article on file with authors).
147 Lustration, which commonly involves barring individuals
implicated in past crimes and atrocities from holding public office, is a very
common transitional justice instrument. For a discussion of lustration laws
in post-Cold War Europe, see Roman David, Lustration Laws in Action: The
Motives and Evaluation of Lustration Policy in the Czech Republic and
Poland (1989-2001), 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387 (2003); see also Mark S.
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also preclude the transfer of economic resources or any
territorial concessions to the rebel leaders or to the victim
groups generally, but would not necessarily preclude efforts by
the international community to engage in rehabilitation efforts
that narrowly target injured victims. In this picture, the
international community could invest resources in addressing
specific harms suffered by the victims of mass atrocities, but
avoid any efforts which are likely to resolve the underlying
conflict in favor of the rebel groups. Such a narrow application
of the lustration sanction that allows injured victims some relief
but denies political spoils to the rebel leaders would accord with
comparative fault principles. These principles suggest that the
victims should not be barred completely from any recovery, but
that their recovery should be reduced based on their level of
fault. 148
Of course, lustration by itself will not necessarily provide
the optimal division of liability between the perpetrators and
the rebel leaders. For instance, a blanket lustration regime that
targets all rebel leaders who engage in provocative behavior will
not account for the fact that different rebel leaders exercise
varying levels of precautions across different conflicts. But no
existing comparative fault regime in the domestic torts context
appears to calibrate the distribution of liability (or
responsibility) between the tortfeasor and victims in a precise
and exacting manner. 149 In any event, while obviously less than
an ideal outcome, lustration surely seems better than the status
quo in which rebel leaders usually gain significant political
benefits in the wake of a humanitarian intervention.
Similarly, when the international community intervenes
in civil wars where rebel leaders have engaged in provocative
behavior against dominant groups, it should not attempt to
impose (or encourage) the parties to negotiate a long-term
political solution to the conflict. The international community
should not be in the business of helping the combatants settle
Ellis, Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former
Communist Bloc, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 181 (1997).
148 See Friedman, supra note 146 at *5 (suggesting that the optimal
comparative fault regime for negligence would increase the relevant party’s
share of liability with that party’s carelessness).
149 See id. at *9 (“One significant difficulty with applying a
comparative negligence rule is that it requires juries and judges to quantify
the amount by which each party was negligent . . . Without specific
guidelines for allocating shares of negligence, any division is at best
subjective if not arbitrary.”).
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their own disputes, especially when one side might lack the
resources or resolve to reach a favorable settlement in the
absence of humanitarian intervention. Otherwise, the
international community will simply become a pawn in the
rebel leader’s strategy to extract favorable political concessions
from the dominant group.
The problem is that when rebel leaders fail to bear
ultimate responsibility for prosecuting their claims through the
use of force they have an incentive to free ride off the efforts of
third parties who intervene in the conflict. In this picture, the
intervention of third party states obscures the real risks and
costs associated with initiating a high stakes rebellion in the
first place. The domestic torts regime deals with this freeriding risk not only through the application of comparative fault
principles but also by imposing on the victim the responsibility
of litigating her own tort claims. In any event, by denying or
limiting relief to rebel leaders who attempt to free ride on
outside intervention, the international community will
encourage rebel leaders to only initiate rebellions that are costeffective and that have a plausible chance of success absent
third-party intervention. Put differently, a comparative fault
regime will discourage rebel leaders from redistributing the
risks of suicidal rebellions to the international community.
Finally, a humanitarian regime based on comparative
fault principles would be consistent with the emerging
international law norm of the responsibility to protect. While
the scope of this new international norm is unclear, and it is
still questionable whether it is an international norm at all, the
UN Outcome document discussing the norm makes it clear that
the primary responsibility of protecting individuals from
humanitarian atrocities still resides in the state in which such
atrocities take place, 150 and that the international community
only has the residual responsibility to use both peaceful and
other humanitarian means to help protect populations from
atrocities when the host state has failed to act. By suggesting
that the primary obligation resides primarily with the state in
which atrocities take place, the UN Outcome Document
implicitly recognizes that the relevant groups engaged in a civil
150 See INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, at Synopsis 1(a) (2001) (“State
sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the
protection of its people lies with the state itself.”).
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war have the responsibility to take precautions to make sure
their followers are not harmed. 151 In a sense, a comparative
liability regime would give the combatants the incentives to
take these responsibilities seriously.
An alternative strategy for reducing the unintended
effects identified thus far is for the international community to
adopt more rigorous criteria in deciding the kinds of rebellions
in which to intervene. 152 The international community could
try to screen out opportunistic rebellions and only provide
humanitarian relief when there is evidence that the rebels have
a reasonable chance to obtain concessions by force of arms
against the dominant group in the absence of intervention. In
theory, the classic international law principles governing
belligerents were supposed to serve as such a screening device.
These principles recognized that external interventions in
support of budding rebellions could lead to widespread internal
instability, increased communal violence, and a possible
breakdown of the state itself. Thus, third-parties were not
permitted under international law to recognize rebels on equal
terms with the state in a civil war until the rebels had acquired
substantial territory by force of arms and attained belligerent
status. 153 Without demonstrating to the international
151 Of course, this obligation rests formally with the state, but in civil
conflicts where the state is weak, rebel leaders ostensibly act as sovereign
elements in their territories.
152Indeed, one way insurance companies deal with this problem is
that they tend to raise the insurance premium significantly whenever they
think there is a high risk of moral hazard. See Jonathan R. Macey,
Commercial Banking and Democracy: The Illusive Quest for Deregulation,
23 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2006) (discussing regulatory schemes that link
political insurance premiums with moral hazard risks).
153 Oppenheim observes that a legal belligerent had to meet four
conditions to qualify for treatment as legal combatants:

[T]he existence of a civil war accompanied by a state of general
hostilities; occupation and measures of orderly administration of a
substantial part of national territory by the insurgents; observance
of the rules of warfare on the part of the insurgent forces acting
under a responsible authority; the practical necessity for third States
to define their attitude to the civil war .....”
LASSA P. OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW § 76 (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht
ed., 7th ed. 1952); see also Lieutenant Colonel Yair M. Lootsteen, The
Concept of Belligerency in International Law, 166 MIL. L. REV. 109, 114
(2000) (discussing how the law belligerency applies to armed conflicts
under international law and the importance of holding territory); David
Wippman, Change and Continuity in Legal Justifications for Military
Intervention in Internal Conflict, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 435, 440
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community that they had both widespread support and the
resources to prosecute a war effectively against the state, rebels
would be denied all the courtesies and privileges accorded to
legal combatants, including the possibility of external military
assistance. 154 Indeed, even when rebels had attained the status
of belligerents, third parties who wished to remain neutral
could not lend any assistance to either side. 155 Today, these
international principles governing belligerents have become
obsolete as both strategic and humanitarian third-party
interventions have become the norm.
B. Allowing a Partial Defense of Provocative Rebellion
Perpetrators of atrocities are routinely subject to a range
of sanctions imposed by the international community,
including economic boycotts, travel bans, financial account
freezes, and criminal prosecutions by international criminal
tribunals. 156 Some of these sanctions can be imposed in the
absence of humanitarian intervention, but others are usually
imposed only when intervention has taken place, such as when
perpetrators from dominant groups are indicted and tried
before international criminal tribunals. But the international
community could allow a provocation defense that would
reduce such sanctions. Like the defendant in a domestic
criminal context, the international community could recognize
a defense of deliberate provocation by victims (or rebel
leaders), which would mitigate the sanctions faced by the
perpetrator of atrocities. Of course, the proportionality of the
dominant group’s response to the provocation should be a
(1996) (arguing that military intervention in support of rebels interferes
with a state’s internal affairs). Indeed, the Supreme Court applied the
belligerency test to confederate rebels during the American Civil War. See
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666-67 (1863) (“[W]hen the party in
rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory;
have declared their independence; have cast off their allegiance; have
organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their former
sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest a
war.”).
154 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, International Law Governing Aid
to Opposition Groups in Civil War: Resurrecting the Standards of
Belligerency, 63 WASH. L. REV. 43, 56 (1988) (discussing the belligerency
standard in international law).
155 See Wippman, supra note __at 442 (observing that those who
wish to remain neutral could not assist either side in the conflict).
156 For a detailed analysis of the prosecution of perpetrators before
international criminal tribunals, see MARK A DRUMBL, ATROCITY,
PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW __ (2007).
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factor in deciding the appropriate level of punishment against
perpetrators.
Although criminal sanctions in the domestic context
tend to focus exclusively on the incentives of perpetrators,
many commentators have observed that criminal law applies a
version of the relative fault principle from torts when it partially
absolves perpetrators from punishment based on the victims’
provocative behavior. 157 For instance, the defense of
provocation or “heat of passion,” which is available in all
jurisdictions in the United States, downgrades an offense of
murder to manslaughter when the defendant can prove that he
killed another in the heat of passion after a provocation. 158
Typically, commentators have justified the provocation
defense as either a partial excuse or a partial justification, but
more recently law and economics scholars have suggested that
the defense not only provides the correct incentives for the
potential perpetrator but also for the potential victim. 159 The
defense might affect the incentives of the victim to engage in
provocative behavior through two different mechanisms. First,
it might do so directly by decreasing the vindictive pleasure that
victims might get from seeing their perpetrators punished. 160
Second, it might do so indirectly because perpetrators will be
less inclined to target victims who take appropriate precautions
and do not engage in provocative behavior. 161 Potential victims
Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of Criminal Law
Attempts, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 317 (1996) (“Mitigating the punishment for
offenders who commit homicide as a result of provoked, uncontrollable
passion provides incentives to potential victims to abstain from provocative
behavior.”); See Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The
Case for a Comparative Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L.
REV. 1181, 1216 (1994) (“A legal system in which provocation functions as a
partial defense provides incentives both for the potential victim to avoid
provocation (by reducing the punishment levied on persons who commit
homicide as a result of provocation) and for the person who considers
committing homicide to avoid carrying it out (by imposing criminal
sanctions upon him).”).
158 See Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law, supra note
___at 1213-1217.
159 See Ben-Shahar & Harel, The Economics of Criminal Law
Attempts, supra note157 at 316-18.
160 See id.; see also Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated
Revenge, 87 Boston Univ. L Rev. 1059, 1062 (2007) (“[V]ictims regard
punishment [by the state] as an important device for restoring losses to their
self worth and status.”)
161 See id.
157
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will have an incentive to take greater precautions if they know
they are less likely to be targeted by perpetrators.
In any event, one need not subscribe to such accounts
of victim motivation in a domestic context to see that reducing
sanctions targeted at perpetrators will likely affect the
incentives of victims in a humanitarian crisis. Unlike domestic
victims in a criminal context, victims facing atrocities in the
context of a civil war stand to gain more than “vindictive”
benefits from the suffering of their perpetrators. Because the
perpetrators and victims of atrocities are usually also political
and military adversaries, any outside sanctions targeted at
perpetrators will tend to translate to concrete benefits to the
victims and their leaders. In the zero-sum world in which many
of these rebellions take place, any outside sanctions inflicted
against a dominant group increases the chance—even if
marginally--that the dominant group will eventually make some
sort of concession to the rebels.
Pursuing this incentive based analysis a little further,
victims of atrocities would likely be more motivated than
domestic victims of crime to internalize the costs of provocative
behavior if they are aware that such behavior will reduce the
sanctions targeted at perpetrators. Unlike punishment in the
domestic criminal context, sanctions targeted at perpetrators
of atrocities may for all intensive purposes be treated as a form
of tort-like compensation for victims. Given this dynamic, we
have now almost come full circle in o analysis: in the current
humanitarian intervention regime, sanctions targeted against a
perpetrator are likely to present the same kinds of moral hazard
risks as other forms of political benefits that victim groups gain
from intervention that do not account for the relative fault of
the victim leaders.
Turning to the perpetrators of atrocities, reducing
external sanctions based on the level of provocation can also
positively influence the manner in which perpetrators choose
targets of atrocities. If the harshest sanctions are only imposed
on perpetrators who target victims who have not engaged in
provocative behavior, then perpetrators might be deterred from
targeting such victims. But if the international community
imposes the harshest sanctions against perpetrators regardless
of the provocative behavior of the victims, then the perpetrator
has an incentive to inflict the harshest level of atrocities against
any rebel group (or non-combatants from such a group)
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regardless of the rebel group’s behavior. Thus, disregarding the
provocative behavior of victims in a sanctions regime raises the
familiar problem posed by marginal deterrence. As put by a
noted economist, “[i]f the thief has his hand cut off for taking
five dollars, he had just as well take $5,000.” 162 At bottom, the
intuition is that we should discourage perpetrators from
committing atrocities on an even larger scale because of a
failure to distinguish between the sanctions targeting two
offenses of different magnitude; 163 in this case, one might argue
that mass killings targeted at a victim group that has engaged in
provocative behavior is of a different magnitude from mass
killings targeted at a victim group that has not.
In sum, even more than in the domestic criminal law
context, there is probably a greater need to apply relative fault
principles when deciding which kinds of sanctions to mete out
against perpetrators of humanitarian atrocities. Both as a
means of discouraging victims from engaging in high risk
behavior and for discouraging perpetrators from committing
the most egregious atrocities regardless how badly the victims
act, a system of escalating sanctions based on victim
provocation makes sense. More importantly, a sanctions
system based on relative fault suggests a more general way of
addressing the reality that sanctions targeted towards
perpetrators sometimes function like benefits to victims (or
victim leaders) in the context of a rebellion or civil war.
VI: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: IS THERE A ROLE FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?
Under the relative fault scheme, this Article argues that
adjusting the benefits available to victims and the sanctions
targeted at perpetrators can influence the victims to take
adequate precautions to avoid atrocities and discourage
perpetrators from engaging in the most heinous atrocities. In
large part, this approach expands on the retributive and
deterrent framework of the humanitarian intervention and
prosecution regime that focuses on perpetrators and extends
162 See George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J.
POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970).
163 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV.
2385 (1997) (discussing the role of marginal deterrence in criminal law);
Dan M. Kahan, Response: Between Economics and Sociology: The New
Path Of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477 (1997) (same).
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that framework to the provocative behavior of rebel leaders in
the context of a civil war or rebellion.
This framework raises an obvious question concerning a
possible role for the international criminal court. If the
international criminal court can be used as an instrument to
influence the incentives of perpetrators, why can it not be used
to target rebel leaders who engage in provocative acts that
instigate atrocities? In other words, instead of recalibrating the
sanctions targeting perpetrators and the benefits available to
victims from humanitarian interventions, why not haul the
rebel leaders who engage in provocative behavior before the
international criminal court?
An exploration of the merits and the scope of the
international criminal court, and of its possible effects on the
behavior of perpetrator or victims, is beyond the scope of this
Article. Suffice it to observe that various commentators have
not only questioned the deterrent effects of international
criminal tribunals generally, 164 but have also raised concerns as
to whether these tribunals might actually exacerbate the level of
humanitarian atrocities. 165 But bracketing for now these
significant criticisms, there are additional reasons why
prosecution by an international criminal tribunals would not be
an appropriate mechanism for addressing provocative behavior
by rebel groups in the context of a civil war or rebellion.
First, many if not most provocative actions by rebel
leaders will likely fall short of qualifying as a crime that falls
164 See MARK A DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 156 at 169-73 (questioning the deterrence effect of
international criminal tribunals); William W. Burke-White,
Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as a Part
of a System of Multi-Level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L 557, 587 (2005) (observing the methodological
difficulties with trying to show that international criminal tribunals deter
atrocities).
165 Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals
Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities ?, 84 WASH U. L REV. 777
(2006) (suggesting that evidence that perpetrators already face preexisting
sanctions that are more severe and certain than those meted out by
international criminal tribunals undermines claims that those tribunals will
have a deterrent effect ); Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trial and Error:
Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT’L
SECURITY 5, 6 (2004) (expressing doubt over deterrence effects of
international criminal tribunals and suggesting that they make peace
settlements more difficult).
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under the jurisdiction of the international criminal court and
virtually all ad-hoc international criminal tribunals. For
instance, the Rome Treaty that establishes the international
criminal court makes it clear that its jurisdiction is limited to
“the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole.” 166 Specifically, these serious crimes of
concern have included: “War Crimes,” “Crimes Against
Humanity,” “Genocide,” and “Aggression.” 167 While the first
three crimes are relatively uncontroversial and are proscribed
by the Geneva Convention, 168 member states have yet to agree
to what kinds of actions would constitute an act of aggression;
so presumably, that crime is still outside the ICC’s jurisdiction
until member states can reach an acceptable definition. 169 In
any event, the relevant crimes usually have to occur during a
war and involve systematic attacks against civilian populations,
which would probably exclude much of the provocative
behavior by rebel leaders. 170

166

Rome Statute, supra note __at art. 5.1 (d).
See id.
168Michael O'Donovan, Criminalizing War: Toward a Justifiable
Crime of Aggression, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 507, 507-08 (2007)
(“The inclusion of the first three crimes was undisputed. The crime of
aggression, however, was highly controversial, and remains divisive today.
Unlike the first three crimes, the crime of aggression implicates not only
individual responsibility, but state responsibility as well.”). Even the
definition of the more widely accepted category of “crimes against
humanity” has been subject to controversy. See Beth Van Schaack, The
Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787 (1999).
169Alberto L. Zuppie, Aggression as International Crime:
Unattainable Crusade or Finally Conquering the Evil?, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L.
REV. 1 (2007) (discussing difficulties with international efforts to define the
contours of the crime of aggression); Grant M. Dawson Defining
Substantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court: What Is the Crime of Aggression,?, 19 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413, 419-420 (2000) (discussing how the
Preparatory Commission has been charged with finding a definition but does
not have one yet.).
170 See Starr, supra note __ at 1269 (observing that the focus of
these international crimes is on civilian deaths during a crisis or wartime).
The treaties establishing the various international criminal tribunals tended
to limit their jurisdiction to atrocities targeting civilian populations. For
instance, Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute reads (emphasis added):
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any
of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack.
Rome Statute, supra note __, at art. 7.1
167
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Second, investigations and prosecutions by international
criminal tribunals are both relatively expensive and politically
controversial and it is unlikely that the international
community has either the political will or the resources to
extend the jurisdiction of these tribunals to a new category of
crimes involving provocative rebel leaders. For instance, the
International Tribunal for Rwanda has tried only 26 individuals
in its seven year existence (at a cost of $1 billion) and has only
26 trials underway. 171 Only 20 more individuals have been
indicted and the tribunal estimates that it may complete 70
trials by the time its mandate expires in 2008. 172 Part of the
problem is that these tribunals often have to pursue
investigations and gather evidence and testimony from
witnesses and places located thousands of miles from where the
tribunals sit. In any event, both the international community
and leading international law publicists seem to be wary of the
high costs of delivering justice through these tribunals. 173
Recent developments suggest that is unlikely that the
international community will be willing to extend the
jurisdiction of these tribunals to prosecuting rebel leaders who
engage in provocative activity. Indeed, escalating costs at the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) have already prompted the United
Nations Security Council to pass resolutions calling for those
bodies to stop issuing new indictments and wrap up all
operations by 2010. 174 Finally, and more importantly, both the
United States and China have still refused to accede to the
Rome Treaty, which casts doubt on the ability of the
international criminal court to carry out its current limited
mandate effectively. 175
President of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
Completion Strategy of International Tribunal for Rwanda, Letter of
December 5, 2005, addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2005/782 (Dec. 14, 2005), available at
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/completionstrat/s-2005-782e.pdf.
172 Id.
173 See, e.g., Jose E Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate:
Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (1999) (observing that
enormous amount of money expended on the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda would have been better spent developing better
domestic criminal accountability in Rwanda).
174S.C. Res. 1534, S/RES/1534 (March 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1503, ¶
7, S/RES/1503 (August 28, 2003).
175 See Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal
Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (2003); John R. Bolton, The Risks and
Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America’s
perspective, 64 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 167 (2001); Michael
171
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Smidt, The International Criminal Court: An Effective Means of
Deterrence?, 167 MIL. L. REV. 156 (2001); Ruth Wedgwood, Fiddling in
Rome, 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 20 (1998). Jenia Iontcheva has also argued that
the lack of support for the ICC from key players such as the United States
suggests that a less centralized approach to criminal enforcement might be
appropriate. See Jenia Iontcheva, Nationalizing International Criminal
Law, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2005). Posner and Yoo have argued that United
States withdrawal from the ICC reflects the unwillingness of the United
States to be subject to an entity it could not control. See Eric A. Posner &
John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 67-70 (2005). For a comprehensive discussion of the U.S. approach
to the ICC negotiations during the Clinton Administration, see David J.
Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47 (2002).
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